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Although conflicts characterize all social orders, their nature and outcome 
vary widely. In some social structures conflicts may be depoliticized and 
channeled toward individuals; in others conflict may have reformist or 
revolutionary consequences. Contrary to Marx's prediction, twentieth-cen- 
tury revolutions have not occurred in core capitalist countries. While these 
societies have experienced varying degrees of social reforms, it has been 
Third World societies that have undergone revolutionary upheavals. To 
some extent reforms in the core and revolutions in the periphery are interre- 
lated, because they are parts of a single world system. On the one hand, 
economic exploitation of the periphery by core countries makes possible a 
higher standard of living, social reforms, and a reduction of internal con- 
flicts. On the other hand, foreign domination and extraction of resources 
from countries in the periphery undermine local attempts at industrializa- 
tion, thus generating revolutionary conflicts. To analyze the relationship 
between social conflict and political development, an understanding of the 
location of different societies within the world system is necessary. The world 
system only sets the stage; it does not determine the action. By focusing on 
social structure, rather than the world system, we can better analyze social 
conflicts and their possible outcome inaction, repression, reform, or revo- 
lution. 
In an important book, States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol pro- 
poses to develop a structural theory of revolution, arguing that "the key to 
successful analysis lies in a focus on state organizations and their relations 
both to international environments and to domestic classes and economic 
conditions."~ Specifically, Skocpol views international pressures such as 
wars or upper-class resistance to state reform as central factors leading to the 
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collapse of the administrative-military apparatus, which in turn pave the way 
for social revolution. 2 Furthermore, she argues that prior weakening or 
collapse of military-administrative apparatus is necessary before mass revo- 
lutionary action can emerge) 
Applied to contemporary Third World revolutions, Skocpol's analysis 
suffers from two problems. The first concerns the collapse of the military- 
administrative apparatus. Obviously, social revolutions involve the collapse 
of the military-administrative apparatus. However, the revolutionary expe- 
riences of Third World countries reveal that neither of Skocpol's conditions 
need exist for revolution to occur. Strong, autonomous class coalitions have 
brought down Third World governments and states in the absence of prior 
weakening or collapse of military apparatus. The collapse of the Cuban army 
at the end of 1958 was due neither to defeat in external war nor wholesale 
upper-class defection. Popular uprising, rather than defeat in war, was 
responsible for revolution in Iran and Nicaragua. And in both cases, the 
upper-class beneficiaries of the prerevolutionary policies remained loyal 
until the end. 
The second troubling feature of Skocpol's analysis revolves around the 
upper-class resistance to state reform. The split between the state and the 
upper class, she claims, is a main condition for revolution. In relation to 
contemporary Third World societies one cannot really speak of a homo- 
geneous upper class, because these societies are undergoing large-scale social 
transformations. In these societies, at least two segments within the upper 
class can be identified. One segment, highly dependent upon the state for its 
privileged position as well as economic and political resources, supports state 
policies even in revolutionary situations. Another segment, ignored and 
sometimes adversely affected by state policies, may oppose the government. 
Within this latter faction, some may be members of the traditional agrarian 
upper class, often adversely affected by industrialization. Others may belong 
to industrial-commercial factions unable to obtain state favors and subsidies. 
Both groups may oppose state policies but their intention is more often to 
bring about social reforms - whether progressive or reactionary - rather than 
revolution. Nonetheless, because of small size and organizational weak- 
ness the contribution of dissident segments of the upper class to revolutionary 
politics is relatively insignificant. 
Although Skocpol has broken new ground in her studies of social revolution 
and should be lauded, her work suffers from a lack of attention to proper 
structural features of social conflict. In the next section, I will present an 
alternative structural theory of social conflict and its possible outcome. 
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An Alternative Theoretical Model 
A theory of revolution must not only specify the circumstances under which 
fundamental change occurs, but must also predict alternative possibilities in 
the absence of revolution. Social revolution is but one outcome of social 
conflict and analysts must specify the situations that generate other results. 
Under what conditions do human beings join together to bring partial or 
fundamental changes? Alternatively, at what point do aggrieved groups 
grant inevitability to their suffering? When do they end up blaming them- 
selves or other victims for their suffering? 
Collective action results from pursuit of common interest by adversely 
affected groups. Historically, it has often taken place as a response to 
violations of established rights and interests, but collective action is by no 
means automatic. For collective action to take place, three conditions must 
be met: 1) victimized groups must clearly identify a concrete social or human 
entity responsible for their suffering; 2) their efforts to find alternative means 
of redressing grievances must be blocked; 3) the aggrieved must have soli- 
darity structures capable of mobilizing their resources. 
Social structure is a central factor influencing the likelihood of collective 
action, its targets, and consequently its outcome. In the following discussion, 
I will analyze two important structural factors: first, the link between politi- 
cal-economic structure; and second, the level of solidarity and consolidation 
among adversely affected groups. Table 1 presents a schematic view of the 
relationship among levels of political-economic integration, levels of consoli- 
dation of adversely affected groups, and their possible forms of conflict. 
By levels of political-economic integration, I mean the extent to which the 
state, rather than market forces, determines the forms and nature of alloca- 
tion and accumulation of capital. Measures of state intervention include: 
TABLE I 
Levels of Political-Economic Intergration 
Low political-economic High polittcal-eeonomic 
integration integration 
Low Segmented class confhct Segmented conflict against the 
consolidation state 
High Popular struggles against Popular struggles to seize state 
consolidation capital power 
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degree of ownership and investment in key sectors of the economy; amount 
of control over financial resources and their allocation to a small circle of 
elites and entrepreneurs; extent to which policies such as limited licensing 
and quotas are used to encourage rapid accumulation; finally, frequency and 
intensity of repression to extract surplus and subordinate the working 
classes. Consolidation refers to the extent of social cohesion. By levels of 
consolidation, I refer to the proportion of population that is both disadvan- 
taged and organized in a bloc. Thus, a high level of consolidation implies the 
formation of coalitions. Although these variables may be applied to different 
types of social orders, the theory developed here can best be used to explain 
social conflicts in capitalist societies. 
I shall argue that segmented class conflict is likely when both the level of 
political integration and consolidation are low. Under such conditions, 
suffering caused by the social order is most often experienced as an 
individual problem. Groups with strong internal solidarity may turn to 
collective action for economic gain. Groups with weak solidarity and few 
resources are more likely to direct their suffering inward or against other 
victims. In either case, the target of attack is deflected from the political 
structure, which consequently remains intact. In contrast, segmented conflict 
directed against the state occurs where there is a high degree of political-eco- 
nomic integration and a low level of consolidation. Because these conflicts 
are segmented, they can be suppressed or rendered ineffective. Reformist 
conflicts may result from a high level of consolidation in combination with a 
low level of integration. Under such conditions, issues of conflict tend to 
remain restricted to the civil society, thus increasing the likelihood that 
political structures will remain unchallenged. Although the state may be 
drawn into class conflict, it may not be the target of attack. Finally, high 
levels of consolidation along with a high degree of political-economic inte- 
gration increase the likelihood of revolutionary conflicts. State intervention 
in capital accumulation politicizes economic issues, making the state vulner- 
able to attack. If the state pursues polarizing strategies, it will be attacked by 
adversely affected classes and groups that have consolidated their forces to 
seize state power. 
To clarify the logic of this theory, the relationship between various forms of 
political-economic structure will be presented along with their implications 
for the likelihood of collective action. Secondly, the effect of solidarity 
structures on collective action will be analyzed. The article will conclude with 
some illustrations. 
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Social Structure and the Transparency of the Social Origins of Injustice 
Human suffering and pain by themselves do not generate collective action to 
transform society. One reason may be that victimized collectivities fail to view 
the causes of their suffering as social (or human) and consequently amenable 
to change. As Moore has put it: " | t  is not the objective suffering that is the 
main cause of moral anger; it is the apparent social cause. 4 To perceive the 
causes as human is a necessary first step towards doing something about 
human misery and injustice." Blaming fate, the gods, other victims, or 
oneself will inhibit the development of a sense of injustice and thus impede 
collective action, even in the face of extreme misery. 
Thus, disadvantaged groups must first identify a concrete social cause 
responsible for their suffering in order to attack it collectively. The target 
of such action varies widely. When directed against specific targets in the 
private sphere such as landlords and merchants, the results may be land 
reform or changes in commodity prices. However, when the state apparatus 
comes under attack as the source of injustice and suffering, the entire social 
structure may experience revolutionary transformation. 
The target of collective action and consequently the nature of social conflict 
is largely determined by social structure. Whether a society will experience 
segmented conflict, reform, or revolution depends on the character of that 
social order. Different social structures may obscure or make transparent the 
connection between the suffering of victimized groups and the human or 
social causes of that suffering. All else remaining equal, economies oriented 
predominantly toward market systems tend to generate the least likelihood 
of revolutionary collective action. Social and economic conflicts deriving 
from the operation of the market forces cannot be easily articulated into 
political issues because of the abstract, depoliticized nature of economic 
transactions. In market economies, buyers and sellers of all commodities 
including human labor power are considered legally free and equal and, as 
such, enter "voluntarily" into contracts of their own choosing. For such 
economic actors, the market is a set of conditions within which they must 
work, and that, because of its abstract nature, cannot be attacked or over- 
thrown. Moreover, that the market occasionally causes misfortune for cer- 
tain capitalists adds to the illusion that the market system itself is impartial. 
Adversely affected groups and individuals may end up blaming themselves 
for their suffering. Consequently, the abstract and depoliticized nature of 
market systems obscures the social origins of human suffering and injustice, 
thus reducing the likelihood of collection action. 
628 
Secondly, for revolutionary situations to arise, the whole state apparatus 
must be called into question. Where the economic system is managed and 
directed by a "self-regulating" market rather than the state, the likelihood of 
revolutionary challenge is sharply reduced. In such social structures, the state 
reproduces the external conditions of production, thereby maintaining the 
system as a whole without directly intervening in the economic sphere. The 
state can then claim to stand above and beyond all social classes, serving no 
particular interest but that of the nation. As a consequence, all social strata 
can be given formal representation in the political arena. Formal democracy 
in turn creates an illusion of equal political power among all social classes. 
Once the state evokes an image of neutrality, it can serve as an integrative 
rather than a divisive force, thereby avoiding attack and threat of revolution- 
ary challenge. 
Of course, social conflicts do emerge in market economies. These conflicts, 
however, tend to remain restricted either to the economic sphere or, at best, 
to the civil society. Such conflicts are unlikely to evolve into ideological 
conflicts and struggles. Thus, these conflicts may generate reform move- 
ments rather than radical social transformation. 
In contrast, capitalist states that directly intervene in the process of capital 
allocation and accumulation tend to generate conditions leading to revolu- 
tionary collective action. State intervention undermines the "invisible hand" 
of the market, thereby politicizing the economy. In addition, such a state 
may be unable to sustain its claim of serving the national interest; it may 
instead become enmeshed in a continual round of contradictions: simulta- 
neously representing the general societal interest as well as particular domi- 
nant-class interests and capital accumulation. Thus, the interventionist state 
increases the likelihood of becoming the target of attack. 
The interaction between state and economy has a profound impact upon 
political consciousness and the intensity of class struggle. In the con- 
temporary capitalist world, no true market economy exists, because states 
intervene in varying degrees in their economies, influencing capital alloca- 
tion and accumulation. In broad outline, at least two types of intervention 
exist: 1) the state may intervene in the economy in a limited extent in order to 
"defend" it against recurrent crises such as recessions and depressions; 2) the 
state may extensively intervene in the economy to promote accumulation 
and growth by controlling resource allocation. This is an offensive interven- 
tion. The classification refers to ideal types and should not be viewed as static 
structures because social, economic, and political conditions always affect 
the nature of the relationship between the state and the economy. 
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The first type of social structure approximates the conditions that already 
exist in most Western societies. The crisis of the 1930s generated political 
processes that led to a restructuring of economic systems in the West, from 
"laissez faire" to Keynesian demand-management and social-welfare policies 
designed to stabilize the macro-economy and enhance the economic security 
of firms and individuals) Subsequent state policies mostly consisted of 
attempts to maintain full employment, control inflation, and provide unem- 
ployment or accident insurance, and welfare programs for the underclass, as 
well as assisting ailing industries. 
In most Western states, such intervention was defensive and limited to 
periods when market mechanisms actually failed. The state did not assume 
primary responsibility for capital allocation and accumulation. Labor legisla- 
tion and fiscal-monetary policy only influenced the condition of accumula- 
tion. Perhaps more importantly, many state activities, such as welfare and 
social security, were redistributive rather than accumulative. Hence, the 
market mechanism predominantly determined the normal operations of the 
economy. 
Following World War 1I, some European states, in response to international 
competition and working-class struggles, intervened even further in the 
economy. Inefficient, uncompetitive industries were nationalized as a result 
of pressures from workers, while capitalist demands led to broad, long-term 
economic planning to balance payment deficits and prevent declining growth 
rates. Such state intervention has resulted in increasing politicization of 
economic conflicts. In those countries where state intervention is higher, the 
level of politicization also seems to be higher and the state is necessarily 
drawn into social and economic conflicts. 
Where leftist parties, socialists and social democrats, have come to power in 
Europe, state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation has been 
further expanded. Greater intervention has inevitably politicized social and 
economic conflicts, but these policies have not polarized society against the 
state because these governments have also introduced egalitarian reforms 
that favor the working class, rather than a small minority of elites. Conse- 
quently, state intervention has not generated the revolutionary crisis so 
characteristic of the Third World. 
States in Third World countries have played an active role in the allocation 
and accumulation of capital. For complex social and historical reasons, 
partly rooted in the colonial experience, a strong commercial-industrial class 
did not develop in these societies. Confronted with powerful, international 
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competition and rising costs of international capital in the twentieth century, 
the enterpreneurial class remained weak in Third World nations. As a 
consequence, Third World states have become highly interventionist, initiat- 
ing industrial development and providing favorable conditions for the rise of 
an industrial class. 
The form and nature of state intervention varies among Third World coun- 
tries, but most of them have pursued many of the following strategies. Many 
states invest extensively in heavy industries, own and control vast economic 
resources such as banking, financial institutions, and crucial sources of raw 
material. The state also enters into joint ventures with private businesses and 
multinational corporations. In some countries, state investment accounts for 
as much as 60 percent of the national investment. 
In addition, to prevent market misallocations and waste of resources, many 
Third World states practice economic planning. They encourage industrial 
development through policies such as allocation of state funds and capital at 
subsidized interest rates, credit rationing, quotas, limited licensing, tax con- 
cessions, wage-price controls, high tariff walls, and overvalued foreign ex- 
change rates in favor of the industrial sector. 
Although relatively successful in general economic terms, these policies have 
proved detrimental to various social classes and interests in many Third 
World countries. In many countries, resources, credit, and machinery are 
insufficiently allocated to the agrarian sector, resulting in the deterioration of 
agriculture. Overvalued currency, designed to facilitate the purchase of 
capital goods and machinery, reduces the value of agricultural exports. 
Food-pricing policies combined with government-subsidized food imports 
undermine agricultural producers. Even where states have moved to improve 
the agrarian sector, interventions have tended to be on the side of large, 
resourceful producers at the expense of small cultivators. These policies have 
widened income disparities in rural areas as well as the income gap between 
rural and urban sectors, resulting in rapid urbanization. Government 
emphasis in most Third World countries on capital-intensive industry has 
not helped absorb the expanding labor force. The presence of a large reserve 
army, along with government repression of the working class, has increased 
the capacity of wealth holders to augment their capital, and thereby fostered 
class polarization. Nor have state policies, such as capital allocation and price 
controls, served small and medium-size firms. Limited licensing, quotas, and 
tariff walls have encouraged growth of inefficient monopolies at the expense 
of small businesses and consumers. Finally, the need for rapid accumulation 
often impelled the state and the private sector to build on the best and invest 
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in relatively developed regions. Such policies have widened the gap between 
regions, adversely affecting ethnic and racial minorities residing in less 
developed areas. The overall result of such policies has been a rise in wealth 
and income disparities, all in the interest of a tiny upper class often tied to 
multinational corporations. 
This development has significant political consequences. In the first place, 
the high level of integration of political and economic institutions in develop- 
ing capitalist societies has undermined the "invisible hand," politicizing 
capital allocation and accumulation. With the politicization of the market, 
victimized collectivities can more readily identify the state, rather than an 
abstract invisible market, as the source of their suffering. A second result is 
the polarization of society. Once the state enters into a direct and visible 
alliance with major capitalists, it can no longer claim to symbolize society 
and the "national interest," for its particular interests become too conspicu- 
ous. 
The state's development policies in Third World countries often lead to the 
exclusion of most of society including the national bourgeoisie, the tradi- 
tional middle class, the working class, and the peasantry. As a result, social 
support for the state is eroded, leaving it vulnerable to attack. In sum, revolu- 
tionary collective action, repression, and political instability in developing 
societies can be attributed in large part to the integration of political and 
e c o n o m i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Thus far, I have analyzed the relationship between social structure and the 
likelihood and nature of collective action, indicating how certain social 
structures are more vulnerable to collective action and revolution than 
others. The following section will focus on the capacity of social groups to 
engage in collective action and effect change. 
Solidarity Structures, Consolidation, and Collective Action 
As the above discussion demonstrates, institutional integration and the 
transparency of the origins of injustice provide the motives and targets of 
collective action. However, this does not tell us whether or not collective 
action will actually take place. To be able to act upon their condition of 
oppression, victimized classes or collectivities need to develop solidarity 
structures to mobilize their resources, provide hope that their situation 
can be changed, and overcome the sense of inevitability of suffering and 
injustice. Hence, collective action requires: 1) strong solidarity structures, 2) 
an effective network for communication and resource mobilization, and 3) 
some form of coalition with other collectivities to consolidate their forces to 
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counter the power of their adversaries. Solidarity theorists such as Gamson, 
Tilly, and Zald maintain that social solidarity, or the integration of individu- 
als into community life, facilitates the mobilization process by providing a 
common set of values and interests within the community, a communication 
network, and an authority structure providing leadership to minimize fac- 
tionalism. The greater these solidarity structures, the greater the communi- 
ty's capacity to claim resources from individual members while at the same 
time reducing exit and disloyalty. 
The social structure influences social solidarity and the capacity of different 
groups and classes to mobilize for collective action. In general, more collec- 
tive cooperation in production and distribution leads to greater group 
cohesion. Stratification also influences the degree of solidarity. The greater 
the stratification within the victimized group, the more difficulties they will 
have in mobilizing due to low levels of solidarity or cohesion. In contrast, low 
levels of stratification create fewer obstacles to mobilization. 
Finally, relations between aggrieved groups and their adversaries must be 
considered. Clearly, conditions that give rise to collective action are charac- 
terized by a higher degree of polarization. However, polarization may be 
restricted by a high degree of vertical cohesion between victims and their 
oppressors, in combination with a high degree of dependency of the former 
on the latter. If victimized groups or classes are not capable of severing their 
ties to their victimizers, no collective action can take place. 
A functionalist approach would emphasize the significance of shared values, 
beliefs, and ideologies as sources of stability that reduce the propensity to 
challenge the social order through collective action. It is true that ideologies 
are used to legitimize existing social relations and thereby secure the submis- 
sion of the subordinate social classes. Ideologies tend to emphasize the 
relative superiority of the dominant classes and their greater contribution to 
societal functioning, survival, and progress. In addition, they usually deny 
structural conflict by emphasizing harmony and order through the promo- 
tion of "higher values" such as race, religion, or nationality. Finally, ideo- 
logies convey a sense of naturalness and inevitability of the existing social 
order. 
Functional theory, however, can neither explain the origins of social values 
nor the fact of their change and transformation. They invoke social inertia 
but give no explanation for it, as though it were descended from heaven. A 
wealth of sociological and historical evidence exists to illustrate how certain 
specific social principles gain hegemony and reinforce social stability. Bar- 
rington Moore put the point brilliantly: 
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The assumptton of socml mertta, that cultural and social contmmty do not reqmre explana- 
tion. obhterates the fact that both have to be recreated anew in each generation, often wtth 
great pare and suffermg. To maintain and transmit a ~,alue system, human beings are 
punched, bulhed, sent to jail, thrown into concentratton camps, cajoled, bribed, made into 
heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up agamst a wall and shot. and sometimes 
e~,en taught soctology. To speak of cultural mertta ts to overlook the concrete interests and 
pnvdege~ that are served by indoctrination, educatton, and the entire complicated process of 
transmitting culture from one generation to the next 6 
Indeed, this complex process is by no means consensual. Force and violence 
have played decisive roles in the development of human civilization. Under 
repressive situations, victims of social processes find themselves incapable of  
resisting their adversaries not because they are unable to conceive of alterna- 
tives, but because of the suffering imposed by repression. In fact, the persis- 
tence of  repression indicates that alternative possibilities exist, at least for 
some segments of the population. 
Repressive strategies diffuse whatever anger victims might have developed 
against their oppressors, thus reducing the likelihood of collective action. 
Unable to change their circumstances, some victimized and powerless groups 
abandon their struggle. Others may even concede legitimacy to an order they 
are powerless to alter, fearing perhaps that otherwise the suffering might 
become intolerable:  Still other victims may end up identifying with the 
oppressors, repressing their outrage and humiliation. In this case, hatred 
may dissipate and become transformed into submission or internalized as 
feelings of inferiority. As long as aggression is directed inward or fateward, 
that is, toward God and religious rituals, it poses little threat to the extant 
social order. 
If the preceding arguments are correct, a correlation can be said to exist 
between the level of solidarity within collectivities, and their capacity to 
recognize their condition as one of  oppression. The greater their level of 
solidarity, the more the capacity they will have for identifying the sources of 
suffering, and the need for redress. Without strong solidarity structures, 
human beings may be unable to mobilize to overcome the fragmentation of 
social life and break away f rom the established social order. Instead, they 
may try to repress the fact of  suffering caused by an unjust social structure or 
are persuaded to accept the blame for their own misfortunes, rather than 
defying the prevailing social order. 
In short, without coalition, fragmented collectivities may become mired in 
protracted conflicts and achieve little in the way of  fundamental  change. The 
greater the level of  consolidation among the disadvantaged groups, the 
greater the probability they will eventually obtain power. 
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The likelihood of consolidation increases during economic crises when 
alternative strategies for living and action become limited. Crises disrupt 
modern urban living conditions, challenging established rights and ways of 
life, and generating or deepening divisions within the dominant classes. 
Crisis situations do not, however, automatically produce collective action; 
they merely set the stage. Lacking acceptable, non-violent options, a disad- 
vantaged group must develop sufficient solidarity structures to mobilize 
resources and to act collectively. This class, if strong enough, may be able to 
draw other adversely affected groups into a coalition. 
Western societies are not generally vulnerable to consolidation. In the first 
place, industrial societies are characterized by both a high level of economic 
surplus and resilience. Secondly, they are highly differentiated, with the 
result that separate social classes tend to experience economic crisis some- 
what differently, thus reducing the likelihood of consolidation. 
In contrast, disaffected groups in Third World societies are much more 
prone toward consolidation of forces. These societies are vulnerable to 
frequent economic crisis for several reasons. To begin, they lack resilience 
because of a low level of accumulation. In addition, because these societies 
are so dependent on the world market, they have little defense against 
economic problems such as inflation, recession, and depression that beset 
more advanced countries. Due to their experience with colonialism, most 
Third World societies rely heavily on a single crop for foreign trade and are at 
the mercy of fluctuations in the world market. Finally, these societies are 
characterized by minimal social and occupational differentiation, with the 
result that economic crisis generates similar experiences among large blocs of 
the population, thereby stimulating consolidation. 
To summarize the argument thus far, it has been suggested that low levels of 
political intervention in capital allocation and accumulation combined with 
a low level of consolidation, generate segmented class conflict. When state 
intervention is low, abstract, depoliticized market forces predominate 
and obscure social origins of injustice. In addition, by remaining impervious 
to attack or overthrow, market forces encourage inaction. Where market 
economy operates in conjunction with formal democracy, they create an 
illusion of equal political power among all social classes, with the state 
serving societal interests. Thus, the two factors reduce the likelihood of 
attacks against the state. Inevitably, conflicts will be confined to the civil 
society and directed against the upper class. Groups with resources and 
strong solidarity could be able to organize and demand economic benefits. 
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handled outside the political arena. Groups with few resources and weak 
solidarity remain inactive. Many may blame themselves or other victims for 
their suffering. Consequently, a combination of low state intervention and 
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social order (see Figs. 1 and 2). 
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the principal target, but the inability to mobilize and act collectively renders 
them vulnerable to repression. On the other hand, reformist conflict is likely 
when the social structure is characterized by a low level of integration and a 
high level of consolidation. Coalitions of the adversely affected - usually 
involving workers, farmers, and the petty bourgeoisie tend to be directed 
against owners of large capital and particular aspects of class relations. Their 
struggles often draw the state into the arena of conflict, but the state does not 
become the target of attack. Popular struggles may demand state interven- 
tion in particular aspects of class relations. Thus, the conflicts may only 
affect social reforms. Finally. revolutionary conflicts are likely to emerge 
where a high level of consolidation coexists with a high level of state 
intervention in capital allocation and accumulation. State intervention poli- 
ticizes accumulation, reduces the scope of the market and renders transpar- 
ent the social origins of injustice. Neither market forces nor fate can be 
blamed for social problems or threats against established rights and interests. 
In addition, high state intervention, in the Third World context, often 
polarizes the society, and thus discredits the government's claim to serve 
societal interests. In the process, class conflict is politicized and directed 
against the state. If challengers are not strong enough, their efforts will fail 
and intense repression will ensue. This is the case in many Third World 
countries today. 
Although this theory can be tested by cross-national research, an examina- 
tion of single cases may better illuminate the argument. For this purpose, I 
have chosen the cases of the United States, Russia, Nicaragua, and Iran. The 
United States is characterized by a free-market economy with a low degree of 
state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation. In contrast, Tsarist 
Russia was an example of a backward European power attempting to 
industrialize through state policies. This pattern of development has actually 
been adopted in many Third World countries today including Iran and 
Nicaragua, the final examples to be considered here. Although they differ in 
economic development and potential, both experienced similar patterns of 
state intervention, which resulted in social revolution. 
The United States 
Despite undeniable social and economic problems in twentieth-century 
America, revolutionary conflicts have not emerged. In the past few decades, 
the United States has experienced one of the highest rates of unemployment 
among advanced industrial nations. Moreover, a considerable portion of the 
American population has lived in poverty throughout much of the post-war 
period. Not surprisingly, the United States has also been characterized by 
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one of the most inegalitarian distributions of wealth and income. Yet none of 
these problems has generated revolutionary conditions. Even the most acute 
periods of economic hardship during the Great Depression led only to a 
series of reforms that enabled organized labor to augment its share of the 
national income during the post-war period. Similarly, the struggles of 
blacks in the 1960s resulted in reforms, the principle one being the Voting 
Rights Act. 
Some might account for the lack of revolutionary potential in terms of the 
high standard of living enjoyed by the American working class in contrast to 
other countries where revolutionary prospects are greater. Although the 
standard of living in the United States is conspicuously elevated, this obser- 
vation contributes little to a theory of revolution. In the first place, evidence 
shows that the standard of living in prerevolutionary Cuba and Iran was 
higher than many of their neighboring countries where revolution has not 
taken place. Furthermore, numerous historical examples can be cited to 
suggest that impoverished people do not necessarily act collectively to 
change their social conditions. Charles Tilly has discussed the absence of 
collection action during the Irish famine in the nineteenth century and in 
poverty-stricken southern Italy during the same period, s Similarly, the histo- 
ries of Persia, India, and China amply portray passivity in the face of extreme 
poverty and misery. Thus, revolutionary potential cannot be derived from 
the standard of living. 
The theory advanced here explains the absence of revolutionary conflict in 
terms of low level of political and economic integration and low level of 
consolidation. When state intervention in capital allocation and accumula- 
tion is low, market forces become predominant. Minimal state intervention, 
combined with the existence of formal democracy, creates the impression 
that the state generally serves societal interests, rather than the interests of the 
upper class. As a result, the state is able to preempt challenge. 
In predominantly market systems, conflicts emerge between the working 
class and the industrial upper class, while the state remains aloof from most 
disputes. Even when the level of consolidation among the dissatisfied is high, 
protest is not focused against the state; consequently, reformist rather than 
revolutionary movements may emerge. This has been the political experience 
in the United States since the Civil War, as a brief historical review will 
reveal. 
American economic development began with rigorous state promotion of 
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growth. Throughout the early nineteenth century, the U.S. government 
underwrote the building of a national infrastructure. The government also 
allocated capital by making land grants for railroad construction and form- 
ing semi-public corporations to finance banks, insurance, inland navigation, 
turnpikes. In 1816, James Madison approved bills to establish the Second 
Bank of the United States and set trade tariffs. James Monroe signed another 
tariff in 1824 as well as bills to provide for general surveys, and authorized 
Congress to subscribe $ 300,000 to the stock of the Chesapeake and Delaware 
Canal Company. Tariffs were pushed even higher in 1828 by John Quincy 
Adams, who also made stock subscriptions for the Louisville and Portland 
Canal and granted lands to Illinois and Indiana to build canals. The govern- 
ment provided subsidies for steamships, the codfishing industry, and the first 
magnetic telegraph line, and made interest-free advances for the manufac- 
ture of small arms. 9 
However, several factors operated to undermine state intervention in capital 
allocation and accumulation. Most important was the rise of social conflicts. 
As the economy matured, sectional and regional interests came into conflict 
over the issue of state intervention. 10 Charges of favoritism, waste, misman- 
agement, and corruption were leveled against the government. The Civil War 
itself was largely the culmination of these conflicts that focused on the issue 
of the use of central power. 
The Civil War reduced state intervention in capital allocation and accumula- 
tion. After the war, the American economy experienced its most rapid 
growth and industrialization with little state intervention. In rare cases, the 
government imposed a high tariff to protect northern industry, thereby 
encouraging accumulation in certain enterprises; such was the case of the 
tinplate industry, then in its infancy. By and large, however, the need for 
government intervention was reduced by rapid economic growth brought 
about by rising prices for American goods in the international market. 
During the post-war era, economic growth was primarily achieved through a 
free-market economy and the initiatives of a strong capitalist class. In 1860 
there were some 500,000 business firms in the United States. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, American technology outstripped that of Europe and the 
British market was invaded with American goods. ~ In 1860, the United 
States was the world's second industrial power. By 1890, the United States 
had attained first place, surpassing England. Between 1870 and 1920 U.S. 
manufacturing output rose over ten-fold, while that of England rose by less 
than three-fold. 12 
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Toward the close of  the century, however, a significant shift away from 
laissez faire policies was discernable among  American intelligentsia. In 1885, 
a small band of  economists proclaiming a "progressive theory of regulation" 
established the American Economic Association. Henry Carter Adams, 
professor at the University of Michigan and cofounder of the AEA, playing a 
leading role in the ICC, advocated the harmonious use of  state power and the 
energies of the entrepreneur in the further development of the private econ- 
omy as a whole. In 1886 Adams argued that: 
the collapse of faLth m the sufficiency of the philosophy of laissez falre has left the present 
generat,on w~thout prmoples adequate for the gmdance of public affaLrs. We are now 
passing through a period of interegnum in the authoritative control of economic and 
governmental pr,nclples., prmoples of action we must have. for nothing is so m~schievous 
as the attempted soluuon of great questLons on the basLs of ummedmte interests aloneY 3 
Economic problems and rising inequalities also led to popular demands for 
state intervention in the economy. Agitation by farmers and merchants was 
instrumental in passing the Interstate Commerce  Act of  1887, which estab- 
lished the first federal regulatory agency. In 1890, anti-wealth, anti-big-busi- 
ness sentiments led to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act. For the 
most part, however, government regulation failed to check big business, and 
instead, in some ways, the agencies were used effectively by businesses to 
coordinate their industries and serve their own interests.~4 Thereafter, the 
government did not move forward in business regulation; al though some 
presidents made limited attempts in that direction, the Congress impeded the 
changes (for example, the Congress rolled back the expansion of the admin- 
istration after World War I). 
Thus, the American economy was left largely unregulated, in part because of  
a lack of strong administrative leadership. ~5 Unlike European and Asian 
nations that retained vestiges of a bureaucratic state apparatus from pre- 
industrial times, the United States entered the industrial era with a weakly 
developed administrative capacity. The main reason for the absence of  
government intervention in the economy was the great power of the Ameri- 
can upper class that opposed state intervention once it was able to accumu- 
late capital. 
Working-class struggles were primarily directed against the capitalist class; 
however, the working class was never strong enough to challenge the power 
of American industrialists. Various factors combined to undermine the 
effectiveness of  the American working class. Worker  solidarity was under- 
mined by the enfranchisement of  all white males in the early nineteenth 
century; an influx of  immigrant  labor willing to work for reduced wages; the 
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possibility of upward mobility; the separation between skilled and unskilled 
workers; as well as racial and ethnic divisions. Radical segments of the 
working class did attempt to mobilize American workers through organiza- 
tions such as the National Labor Union (with between 100,000 to 400,000 
members in 1870), the Knights of Labor (claiming 700,000 members in 1886 
just prior to the Haymarket affair, which largely contributed to the organiza- 
tion's dissolution), and the Industrial Workers of the World. The impact of 
these organizations was limited. For example, in the wake of the famous 
Pullman strike of 1894, when labor's influence in Chicago was at its height, 
Labor-Populists won only about 20 percent of the potential vote (40,000 out 
of 230,000). Moreover, the success of labor was restricted to specific regions 
rather than the whole country.~6 
The final and most important factor weakening the working-class struggles 
was the use of repressive force by the American upper class. This class was so 
powerful that it was able to hire its own private army, the Pinkerton Agency, 
to defend itself against the working classes. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, active Pinkerton agents numbering some 2,000 and reserves of 
30,000 totaled more than the standing army of the federal government. ~7 This 
force, supplemented by state militias, effectively kept the working class in its 
place. 
The American upper class continued its domination into the twentieth 
century, competing successfully in foreign markets while resisting regulation 
and government interference at home. The Great Depression, however, 
changed the situation. The depression caused economic hardship for major 
segments of the American population. Perhaps the single most telling statis- 
tic is unemployment, which rose from about 1.6 million in 1929 to 4.3 million 
in 1930, and 8 million in 193 I. By 1933 some 12.8 million, or a quarter of the 
labor force, was without employment. Another devastating consequence of 
the depression was the skyrocketing rate of bankruptcy, especially among 
small businesses. Eighty-five thousand businesses failed. To survive, firms 
reduced wages drastically. "In Pennsylvania, workers were paid 5 cents an 
hour in sawmills; 7 cents in general contracting. In Ohio, the earnings of 
office workers were cut by a third, those of store clerks by nearly half. ''~8 
Among those adversely affected were the American farmers. While people 
went without food, crops rotted in the fields in many areas. "Western 
ranchers, unable either to market their sheep or feed them, slit their throats 
and hurled their carcasses into canyons." In 1932, as much as 13 million bales 
of cotton could not be sold for enough profit to pay for the picking. While 
farm income dropped, taxes and mortgage obligations remained constant; as 
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a result, thousands of farmers lost their land. 19 On a single day in April 1932, 
one-fourth of the entire area of the state of Mississippi went to auction, 
leading Governor Bilbo to declare that even he was turning pink. 
Perceiving their situation individualistically, most of the sufferers, especially 
unemployed workers, initially felt guilty and ashamed of their predicament. 
Blaming themselves, they failed to demand relief. However, as savings ran 
out and unemployment mounted, the unemployed began to recognize the 
social nature of the problem. Many came to believe that if there were no jobs, 
at least they were entitled to enough benefits to insure survival. This con- 
clusion led many workers to stop blaming themselves and initiate collective 
action. 
Early on, food riots were a common form of popular protest. With the 
appearance of organizers, especially communists, demonstrations were set 
up in a number of major cities. Most of the poor directed their protest against 
the inadequate relief system in effect and cared little about who was actually 
doing the organizing. Although some improvements were made in the relief 
system, the arrangement was inadequate and often broke down. 20 
Collective action by farmers, struggles by the unemployed, wage cuts, and 
business failures eventually culminated in Democratic victory in November 
1932. Franklin D. Roosevelt swept to victory by a large margin, polling 
22,880,000 votes to Hoover's 15,750,000. Roosevelt carried more counties 
than any presidential candidate had ever won before, including 282 that had 
never gone Democratic. With the exception of 1912, when the party was 
divided, no Republican candidate had ever been defeated so badly. 2t In the 
Congress also, candidates that advocated adequate relief appropriations 
were elected. 
By inauguration day, economic conditions were critical. The national in- 
come had declined dramatically from $ 380 billion in 1929 to $ 50 billion in 
1932 and was still dropping, banks had closed their doors, and unemploy- 
ment was rising because half of all the nation's manufacturing units had 
closed down. By June 1933, the end of his first "Hundred Days" in office, 
President Roosevelt had passed the core of the New Deal legislation. The 
National Industrial Recovery Act was intended to promote economic recov- 
ery through cooperation between business and government. Measures such 
as fixed prices were enacted to insure fair competition in business and 
stabilize production. To ensure the political support of labor, the NIRA gave 
the workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. Farmers were 
appeased by cheap credit, price supports, limited production, and govern- 
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ment purchase of surplus crops. Most urgent was a program of emergency 
relief for the unemployed. Between May 1933 and June 1936, the federal 
government spent $3 billion on relief alone. 
This signaled a major shift in government policy. Although after World War 
I business had undertaken some measure of self-regulation through trade 
associations in 1922, Roosevelt himself had been president of the American 
Construction Council - it had not invited state intervention. By 1931, some 
business leaders, notably Henry Harriman of the Chamber of Commerce 
and George Swope of General Electric, along with leaders from oil industry, 
were calling for national economic planning. In unstable businesses like the 
coal and garment industries, the demand for planning came from labor 
leaders such as John Lewis of the United Mine Workers. Workers in 
competitive industries also favored regulation because of the hardships they 
were experiencing. 22 
Although designed to direct the nation's economic recovery, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act itself exacerbated existing conflicts and even gener- 
ated new ones. In Section 7(a) of the NIRA, the industrial working class 
began organizing for unionization and collective bargaining. For about a 
century, American workers had had the right to organize, but unionization 
had been frustrated by employers. In Section 7(a) of the NIRA, the federal 
government gave its official approval to the formation of unions and collec- 
tive bargaining. Once again, militants, especially communists, played a key 
role in unionization. In response, many industrial firms interpreted the law in 
a self-serving manner and organized company unions. Not surprisingly, 
labor resisted the imposition of company unions and struck a number of 
large industrial firms. Three times as many workers went out on strike after 
the passage of NIRA in 1933 as in the previous year. Many of the strikes 
culminated in violent confrontation between workers and employers; but 
this time employers were blocked from using court injunctions or the Pinker- 
ton agents or the state militia to dispense strikers. Although Roosevelt's 
support for labor soon diminished, the working class gained a significant 
victory in the Wagner Act of July 1935 (which abolished child labor and 
established collective bargaining, a minimum wage, and maximum working 
hours). This victory was achieved through a combination of factors such as 
workers' strikes, Senator Wagner's efforts on behalf of this legislation, and 
some middle-class support for labor. 
Despite some labor success, segments of the NIRA were gradually eliminat- 
ed as segments of the business community began to attack government 
interference. To implement Title I, which called for the regulation of indus- 
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try, General Hugh Johnson, head of the NRA, developed codes for fair 
competition. Partly because of a lack of administrative personnel, most of his 
officials were recruited from the very industries to be regulated. Major 
corporations were thus able to use their political position to their economic 
advantage. They stabilized production and granted monopolistic prices to 
their own firms; however, industries and small businesses that had been left 
out became increasingly dissatisfied with this government-business "cooper- 
ation." Eventually, as the result of a suit by a small poultry-processing 
company, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional, and government inter- 
vention in the economy declined. 
Despite conflicts between labor and capital during the Great Depression, 
revolution did not occur in the United States. The failure to achieve a radical 
outcome might be explained by Leninist analysts as resulting from a misdi- 
rected emphasis on unionization and economic issues by the vanguard. 
Although this argument may be correct as far as it goes, it does not account 
for the Communist Party's pursuit of such a strategy. Instead I argue that the 
failure of revolution to emerge was rooted in the American social structure. 
Because of the historical differentiation between political and economic 
structures in the United States, working class conflicts were directed against 
the capitalist class, rather than the state, or both. During the depression, the 
state promoted the interests of the working class through Section 7(a) of the 
NIRA. The subsequent conflicts were directed principally toward private 
corporations, not the social structure as a whole. The result was reform 
rather than revolution. 
Meanwhile, the state did become the target of small business and major 
industrialists left out of the closed alliance between big business and the state. 
State regulation of prices and production during the New Deal weakened the 
market forces. As the economy became politicized, segments of business 
increasingly attacked government intervention in the economy. 
The capitalist class steadily pursued policies designed to weaken collective 
bargaining and depoliticize the economy. With the leftward shift of a seg- 
ment of the CIO after 1935, middle-class sympathy for labor waned. By 1937, 
labor strikes had been put down by New Deal governors in a number of 
states without opposition from Roosevelt23 American labor was weakened 
still further by the division between the CIO and AFL, and by World War II. 
A major restriction was placed upon labor during the Cold War with the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which some saw as a direct corporate attack. 
Representative Donald L. O'Toole of New York put it this way: "the Bill was 
written sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, page by page by the 
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National Association of Manufacturers. ''24 The Taft-Hartley Act gave courts 
the power to fine for alleged violations and established a sixty-day cooling off 
period during which strikes could not proceed. It outlawed mass picketing 
and secondary boycotts. Most significantly, it practically outlawed the elec- 
tion of communists as union officials. This last measure led the CIO to expel 
eleven unions in 1949, further undermining the working-class movement. 
The expulsion made possible the eventual merger of the AFL and CIO in 
1955. In succeeding years, labor organizations limited themselves to primari- 
ly economic issues. 
As we have seen, American economic transformation in the post-Civil War 
period was largely independent of the state, occurring instead through a 
free-market economy. Had government intervened directly in the process of 
capital allocation and accumulation, workers might have become more 
politicized and militant. If the NRA had survived, the state might have 
been attacked as an ally of big business. Indeed, shortly before the end of the 
NRA, some labor leaders, such as John Lewis, charged as much. With the 
demise of the NRA in 1935, state intervention in the industrial sector con- 
tracted. Similarly, bankers, not the state, were the primary targets of farmers' 
protests. Their main demand of the state was to regulate the market. 
Today, the state plays little direct role in capital allocation and accumulation 
in the United States. It makes neither industrial investments of its own nor 
joint ventures with private industry. The state owns no banks that allocate 
capital. The government does not limit licensing in the private sector nor 
does it allocate quotas of foreign exchange. Direct state intervention in 
capital allocation and accumulation is generally low and occurs mostly for 
defensive purposes (e.g., farm subsidies, Chrysler bailout). Thus, its polar- 
izing effect is not great. Finally, the state does not directly and systematically 
use its repressive forces against labor. Low levels of state intervention 
combined with the existence of formal democracy create the impression that 
the state generally serves societal interests. These factors together deflect 
attacks against the state. 
In the predominantly depoliticized, market-oriented economy of the United 
States, the working class is excluded from exercising power, despite the 
existence of formal democracy. Highly differentiated and disorganized, the 
American working class is unable to act collectively to pursue its interests. 
Although organized labor in powerful industries has secured economic 
benefits, the vast majority of American workers remain unorganized and 
vulnerable to market fluctuations. Even the massive layoffs of the early 1980s 
initiated by the American capitalists have not politicized the American 
working class. 
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The consequence of the operation of the free-market economy has been 
much unnecessary suffering. Many American workers blame themselves for 
their social situations, feeling ashamed and guilty for what they perceive as 
underachievement. 25 The social consequences of such a perspective were 
brought out in a congressional investigation of the connection between 
unemployment and mental illness. According to congressional testimony, a 
one percent increase in the unemployment rate sustained over six years was 
associated with 20,240 cardiovascular deaths, 920 suicides, 643 homicides, 
and 4,227 state mental hospital admissions. 26 Clearly, much of the suffering 
caused by the social structure finds expression outside of the political arena. 
Unemployment is a modern social problem unknown in pre-capitalist socie- 
ties (it would be a contradiction in terms to say that slaves or serfs were 
unemployed). It results from the operation of the market and is therefore 
difficult to attack. Once suffering is directed inward or against other victims, 
it is diverted from its social and political sources. As long as the political 
structure is not directly attacked, political dissidence, by definition, may not 
exist, but human suffering is real. 
In summary, important social problems do not find political expression in 
the United States, where political-economic integration and consolidation are 
low. The result is largely political inaction. Organized groups can only 
generate segmented class conflict for securing economic interests. Even 
during times of high consolidation, organized social groups tend to pursue 
reformist social movements. Low levels of political and economic integration 
combined with formal democracy insulate the state from revolutionary 
challenge. In the decade of depression, American workers acted collectively 
against their employers. Formal democracy enabled them to elect FDR, who 
revealed interest in some changes. The outcome was the New Deal rather 
than revolution. 
Russia 
In contrast to the United States, a number of societies have experienced 
massive revolutionary upheavals in the twentieth century, beginning with 
Russia. The Russian experience after the reforms of 1861 reveals how the 
interplay between political-economic integration and solidarity structures 
can lead to revolution. 
In Russia during the nineteenth century, the highly militarized state bureau- 
cracy exercised greater power and influence over the civil society than in 
Western states. The Russian landed upper class, although dominant, never 
achieved the immunity, autonomy, and economic strength of its Western 
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counterparts. In response to the humiliating defeat of the Crimean War, 
(1853-1855, with England and France), the Imperial state initiated a series of 
modernizing reforms. The new measures included establishing a modern 
judicial system, universal military service, and zemstvo representative as- 
semblies and municipal dumas with limited powers of self-government. Two 
additional reforms drastically changed the Russian social structure and 
widened state intervention in the economy while simultaneously weakening 
the landed upper class. The first was the abolition of serfdom in 1861, 
followed by a state development policy that extracted greater surplus from 
the agrarian sector for rapid industrialization. These policies threatened the 
landed upper class; but members of this class could not challenge state power 
because they became increasingly dependent on the state to maintain their 
social and economic position. 
Land reform, partly initiated for purposes of modernization and partly out 
of fear of abolition of serfdom from below, and the state economic policies 
had adverse effects on major segments of the upper class. Although the 
Landlord Committee had some influence in implementing land reform, the 
reform subjected the upper class to capitalistic practices to which it could not 
adapt quickly. Thus, many land holders were forced to sell their estates to 
merchants and peasants. Between 1877 and 1905, the upper class lost nearly 
one-third of its land. To provide financial assistance to the hereditary 
nobility, the state established the Nobles' Land Bank, which loaned large 
sums with combined interest-and-amortization payments lower than those 
charged the peasantry by the state-run Peasants' Land Bank) 7 
Land reform also meant hardship for most of the peasants, who generally 
received the more unproductive land from the estate. To buy their liberty, 
peasants had to put up 20 percent of the value of the land. The state provided 
the rest, which was to be repaid in the course of 49 years at a rate of 6 percent 
annual interest. Many peasants could not keep up with the payments and 
increasingly fell into arrears, which increased from 22 percent of the total 
annual payments in 1875 to 119 percent by the end of the century. 28 
State agricultural policies added to the problems associated with land re- 
form. With a weak commercial and industrial base, Russia's industrial 
development was dependent on Western Europe. To repay foreign loans and 
interest charges, the government needed a large surplus, which it obtained 
through grain exports. From 1890 until 191 l, grain accounted for between 46 
and 52 percent of all Russian annual exports)  9 This dependence on foreign 
grain sales brought little benefit to landlords and cultivators, who favored 
free trade for low-custom duties to avoid paying high prices for imported 
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manufactured goods. Favorable import policies along with improved culti- 
vating techniques would have increased agricultural production and 
widened the market for the industrial sector. 
Instead, state economic policies directed by Count Witte after 1890 moved to 
restrict peasant consumption rather than encourage production. In addition 
to redemption payments, peasants paid from ten to forty times more taxes 
than estate owners. Whereas landlords paid between 2 and 10 percent of their 
income to the state, peasants were assessed at more than 50 percent. Of some 
208 million rubles levied in 1872, 195 million rubles came from peasants, 
while landlords paid a mere 13 million. Although direct taxation declined by 
the end of the century, it still imposed a heavy burden for the impoverished 
Russian peasantry. The state also levied a heavy excise tax on alcoholic 
beverages, a government monopoly highly consumed by the low income 
rural population, many of whom were alcoholic. Finally, the state indirectly 
taxed peasants through the sale of kerosene, tobacco - both government 
monopolies - matches, sugar, and imported staples such as iron, cotton, tea, 
and manufactured goods. 
Low productivity, combined with population growth and increasingly heavy 
extraction of agrarian surplus resulted in a deterioration of peasant life. Per 
capita output declined after 1890. 30 Per capita grain consumption fell by 
about 200 percent between 1883 and 1914. 31 As the population increased, the 
size of the average peasant holding shrank from 13.2 desyatinas (one desya- 
tina is 2.7 acres) in 1877 to 1.4 in 1905. The number of cattle also declined 
from 37.2 per hundred persons in 1880 to 30 in 1909. Peasant nutrition, 
estimated in a report to Premier Count Witte to be deficient by 30 percent 
under normal circumstances, worsened with harsh government policies) 2 
Despite the increasing frequency of famines and peasant starvation, 
government grain exports continued. 33 
Russian economic development was paid for in part by the declining stand- 
ard of living of the peasantry, as the state used agricultural surplus to 
subsidize industrial projects. The state rejected a laissez faire policy of 
development and instead assisted the private sector directly in rapid indus- 
trialization. To provide capital for investment, the government turned the 
central bank into the State Bank, which induced private banks to initiate 
financial operations. The State Bank cooperated closely with private banks, 
carefully nursing their financial operations until the collapse of the Tsarist 
Russia in 1917. Between 1892 and 1900, the banking system put 229.6 million 
rubles at the disposal of the economy. Huge state expenditures to set up 
government-owned industries also injected money into the economy. 
648 
Between 1893 and 1900, the state spent 278.3 million rubles a year on 
railroads, for a total of 2,226.6 million rubles. Tremendous expenditures for 
ports and ships during 1893 and 1894 alone involved 237.8 million rubles. 
New capital introduced into the Russian economy by government policies in 
the 1890s totaled more than 3,000 million rubles, "a sum exceeding the yield 
of war indemnity which the Germans received from France in 1870. T M  
The state also provided highly favorable conditions for the growth of indus- 
try. In the 1870s and 1880s, Russian industrial organizations requested and 
were granted protective tariffs. By the end of the century, tariffs for several 
heavy industries had risen so high that some imports had become prohibi- 
tively expensive. In addition, the government encouraged domestic indus- 
tries by excluding foreign competitors from profitable state-subsidized con- 
tracts to construct railroads and ports. As a result, Russian business enjoyed 
a monopoly of large construction projects and charged correspondingly high 
prices for their services. 
Such government protectionism was deemed necessary because otherwise 
private businesses would not have undertaken major investments under 
conditions of high risk. Over time, however, state policies favoring the 
private sector were increasingly criticized for favoritism and squandering 
public money for the benefit of tycoons. In response to criticism of negligent 
and wasteful policies, the government eventually took over the whole railway 
economy. 
State economic policies paid off in rapid development. Between 1890 and 
1900, Russian industry grew at an average rate of eight percent per year, and 
industrial production more than doubled. During the same period, the 
number of factories and works increased from 32,254 to 38,141; while output 
rose from 1,502.6 million to 3,438.9 million rubles) 5 In 1900, Russia's oil 
production was the highest in the world. 36 
Despite rapid industrial growth, development affected social groups and 
classes unevenly. Government policies encouraged heavy industries such as 
iron, steel, petroleum, and machinery. Within these sectors, a small number 
of firms utilizing sophisticated machinery accounted for a major share of the 
output. In the petroleum industry, for example, less than 10 percent of the 
firms produced 69 percent of all petroleum products. In 1898, 4 percent of all 
coal mines accounted for 43 percent of the total coal output. 37 Crucial to the 
nation's industrial development, were railroads constructed by a dozen 
"favorite" plants owned primarily by persons close to the upper circles. 
Through its monopolistic practices, the state virtually subsidized this giant 
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industry. Even modest estimates indicate that overpayment cost the national 
treasury 15 million rubles a year. 38 
Such policies enriched not only major Russian industrialists but their foreign 
counterparts as well, for fully one-third of the capital invested in Russia in 
the late nineteenth century was supplied by foreign firms. 39 Civil servants 
also profited from administering state enterprises, allocating capital, licens- 
ing, imposing quotas and controls on the private sector. In contrast, small 
firms producing consumer goods received little of the preferential treatment 
extended to large enterprises. This was a result of government strategy that 
avoided development through light industries based upon mass-market 
demand. 
National minorities and the urban working class suffered as a result of the 
state economic practices. Russian industrialization was concentrated in 
relatively few regions of the country and provided little benefit to most 
national minorities. Consequently, regional disparities widened during the 
period of heavy industrialization. Industrial workers labored under 
adverse conditions, working from twelve to seventeen hours a day. The 
government directly intervened in factories to prevent the formation of labor 
organizations. Legislation passed in 1886 extended police surveillance in 
factory towns to control labor. State intervention on behalf of the capitalist 
class proved detrimental for workers. Wages remained low in light industries 
that did not receive government subsidies. Employees in heavy industries 
fared little better; oil workers in Baku worked sixteen or seventeen hours 
daily for low wages: ~ 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, in response to worker pressure, 
the government promulgated legislation to modify the situation. New laws 
regulated conditions for hiring, abolished child labor, and outlawed payment 
in kind. In 1896, legislation was enacted limiting the workday to eleven hours 
and establishing Sunday and holidays as days of rest for all workers. Howev- 
er, these restrictions applied only to enterprises that employed more than 
twenty workers, and even then were rarely enforced. Although the govern- 
ment improved laws concerning industrial accidents, the predicament of 
workers injured on the job was largely unchanged: t At the turn of the 
century, the Russian working class remained both exploited and defenseless. 
With the depression of 1900, economic growth slowed and the resulting crisis 
(combined with repression) left the working class no alternative but rebel- 
lion. In the summer of 1903, the Baku oil workers' strike was quickly taken 
up in Tiflis, Batum, and other Caucasian towns. Workers walked out in 
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Odessa, Kiev, and elsewhere in Russia. Equally important was the fact that 
strikes rapidly assumed political character. 
Working-class insurrection gradually assumed nation-wide proportions and 
numerous Soviets were founded. Soon there were continual work stoppages. 
Workers participated in more than one strike, accounting for the fact that 
out of an industrial work force of less than two million, the number of 
strikers enumerated in 1905 was 2,865,145. Roughly two-thirds of the walk- 
outs were political in nature and were directed against the state and the large 
firms. 
Rural areas also showed signs of rebellion. Poverty-striken peasants in some 
districts raided and attacked the estates of landowners in the spring of 1902. 42 
Early in 1905, striking agricultural workers illegally cut timber belonging to 
the state and individual landlords. In August, a gathering of peasant dele- 
gates met near Moscow with a few representatives from revolutionary parties 
and proclaimed "the Constitutional Assembly of the All-Russian Peasants' 
Union" to work for the abolition of private landed property. By autumn, 
peasant rebellion had spread throughout the countryside. 43 
However, lack of leadership, of coordination of collective action, and of a 
clearcut program fatally weakened the movement. Most of the peasant 
rebellions were unplanned and sporadic. Urban workers were better organ- 
ized, but poorly coordinated. Resistance by two thousand armed workers in 
Moscow collapsed after being fired upon by reluctant soldiers in the Moscow 
garrison backed by reinforcements from St. Petersburg. Although Moscow's 
poor backed the revolutionaries, solidarity broke down when they were 
forced to split into small groups to avoid the army's fire. Had workers in St. 
Petersburg struck and paralyzed the railroads, as occurred earlier, military 
reinforcements would not have arrived at all and the outcome might have 
been very different. Eventually, as Count Witte had calculated, a new 
constitution and the promise of civil liberties in October 1905 split liberal and 
socialist forces. The dissolution of solidarity resulted in the final defeat of the 
rebellious forces. By mid-June 1907, the Tsar dissolved the Second Duma 
along with whatever civil liberties had been gained. 
During the next few years, state agricultural policies underwent some modi- 
fication. Recognizing the potential danger of rural communes, the govern- 
ment attempted to break them up and instituted private plots. In November 
1907, the compulsory communal life of peasants was weakened by legislation 
giving them the right to demand their share of land from the consolidated 
holding. Three years later, another law made possible the dissolution of any 
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commune by a majority vote of its members. These reforms, initiated by 
Stolupin, had little effect, as evidenced by the fact that only 22 percent of 
those peasants living communally chose to leave. Of these, only the more 
prosperous peasants actually benefitted from these changes, while the major- 
ity of peasants continued to live in traditional communes. 
During this period, the Peasant's Land Bank provided capital to encourage 
the formation of individual farms and occasionally granted fifteen-year loans 
without interest or subsidies. By the end of 1915, the bank had extended 
300,000 loans averaging 100 rubies each, and 58,000 grants averaging about 
22 rubles. The government also showed more interest in improving agricul- 
tural productivity by importing agricultural implements and providing tech- 
nical education. 
It is unclear, however, whether those who established individual farms really 
benefitted from the reforms. For example, protective tariffs that encouraged 
cotton cultivation in central Asia, were beneficial only to the small minority 
of producers who used modern equipment. Industrial tariffs kept the price of 
most manufactured products high, which proved extremely disadvantageous 
for the peasant population. A comparison of prices in Russia, England, 
Germany, France, and the United States in the last pre-war year indicates 
that while most foodstuffs were about one-third cheaper in Russia, most 
manufactured goods were priced higher than in other countries. 44 Finally, 
the reforms may actually have concentrated land in the hands of more 
prosperous farmers, as some peasants and nobles lost their holdings. 
The state industrial policies remained largely the same. The government 
continued to finance its development by taxing the population through its 
monopoly of goods such as alcohol, railroads, kerosene and through indirect 
taxes on mass consumed goods like tea, tobacco, sugar, and matches. The 
state borrowed heavily from abroad to finance industrial development. In 
1913, Russia ranked second in the world in absolute size of its national 
debtA 5 The state protected industries through limited licensing, quotas, tariff 
policies, and guarantees that encouraged investment in risky areas. State 
banks and private financial institutions, still dependent on the government, 
continued their previous emphasis on large, heavy, modern industries at the 
expense of small, light, traditional manufactures. 46 During this period, the 
industrial structures created by the state were further solidified through 
inddstrial concentration and formation of monopoliesY 
The result of these policies was rapid economic development. Per capita 
GNP grew from 63 rubles in 1897 to 101.4 rubies in 1913. 48 Agricultural 
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income grew by 88.6 percent from 1900 to 1913. F rom 1911 to 1913, grain 
exports  were 50 percent higher than from 1901-1905. Exports  of butter,  flax, 
and other agricultural  products  also increased. 49 Industr ial  development  was 
also impressive, as the total  value of industrial  output  increased 72.9 percent,  
from 2,839.1 million rubles in 1897 to 4,907.7 in 1908. 50 Between 1907 and 
1913, annual  industrial  growth was about  6.25 percent. 
While a t iny upper  class was the main beneficiary of  the government  indus- 
trial policy, the Russian working class gained little. With the Stolypin "coup 
d' etat" of 3 June 1907, repression and persecution of workers spread,  wiping 
out the employers '  concessions made after the 1905 revolution. During the 
recession of 1907-1909, the nascent labor  union movement  fell into disarray.  
By the end of 1907, 25 to 30 percent of the metalworkers  in the Moscow 
region and 36 percent in the capi tal  were out  of work. 5z In the meantime,  
rapid economic growth expanded  the Russian working class, which became 
concentrated due to the emphasis  on heavy industry. According to Gordon:  
In the concentratLon of productton, Russia, as early as 1895 had surpassed Germany. In that 
year. the wage earners m Russtan factories with more than 500 employees constituted 42 
percent of all workers, whereas m Germany, these large establishments accounted for only 
15 percent of the working population.., by 1912 the workers m Russian factories with more 
than 500 employees were 53 percent of the whole. As late as 1925 m Germany. the 
estabhshments wtth 1,000 or more employees had 30 percent of all workers in factories with 
more than fifty hands. Russta, as early as 1912 had 43 percent m factories employing 1,000 
persons and over..even more striking is the comparison with the Untted States. Of all 
employees in establishments wtth more than fifty hands, the workers m enterprtses of five 
hundred hands or more were 47 percent m the Umted States m the year 1929. They were 61 
percent in Russia m 1912) ~ 
This great concentra t ion inevitably enhanced the capaci ty  of the working 
class to act collectively. At  the same time, the bargaining power  of workers  
increased due to economic improvement .  After  nearly a decade of s tagna- 
tion, the Russian economy began to revive toward  the end of 1909, first in the 
consumer  sector and later in heavy and capi tal  goods  industries. Unemploy-  
ment  fell, and workers '  posi t ion in the labor  marke t  improved,  leading them 
to demand  redress of grievances. 53 Just  before the war, the government  was 
forced under protest  to liberalize and allow the format ion  of  labor  unions 
and Bolshevik activities. 
In the five years pr ior  to World War  I, Russian workers and peasants 
intensified their struggles. Walkouts  rose f rom 222 in 19 l0 to 3,534 in 1914, 
while the number  of workers on strike grew from 46,623 to 1,254,441. Strikes 
became increasingly polit ical  in nature. In 1914, poli t ically mot ivated strikes 
numbered  982,810, the highest since 1905) 4 Strikers demons t ra ted  consider-  
able solidari ty.  For  example  in 1912, the massacre of several hundred  
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workers in the Lena gold fields of Siberia was protested by a wave of strikes 
across the country. In March 1914, just a few months before the war, 
industrialists recognized the dimensions of the crisis and declared a lockout 
in St. Petersburg that affected some 70,000 workers. This, too, resulted in 
large-scale demonstrations. Rural areas were also in turmoil during this 
period. Between 1910 and 1914, more than 13,000 disturbances broke out 
among the peasantry. 55 
Thus, Russia entered the European conflict convulsed by politicization and 
polarization. During the war, the state imposed new demands for resources 
and manpower upon the population, especially the working classes. Extrac- 
tion of resources further jeopardized the survival of an already weak state. 
Shortages and rising inflation caused by the war aggravated the plight of 
workers and peasants. Despite wartime restrictions, walkouts and food riots 
persisted, although at a lower intensity throughout 1915 and 1916. Eventual- 
ly, strikes spread nation-wide, and the working class banded together with 
the peasantry to oppose the Tsarist state. Soldiers, suffering from the hard- 
ships and defeats of the war and in sympathy with the opposition, stopped 
fighting for the Tsar and joined rebellious workers in Petrograd. In March 
1917, Tsar Nicholas lI fell, preparing the way for the Bolshevik seizure of 
power in October. 
The government's role in accumulation progressively expanded to the point 
where, by 1914, the Russian state was the biggest landowner and capitalist in 
the world. The state controlled much of the country's financial assets, 
including the State Bank, Peasant's Land Bank, and the Noblemen's Bank. It 
also possessed vast tracts of land encompassing 60 percent of the country's 
forests as well as valuable mines and ore-processing plants in the Altai, the 
Urals, and Siberia. 56 The state owned over 10 percent of the nation's indus- 
try. 5; Finally, the state received direct and indirect taxes, in addition to 
borrowing money from abroad. 
The state used its enormous capacity to pursue highly uneven development 
policies. Favorable credit and relief were provided only to certain members 
of the upper class. As the economic position of wealthy land owners weak- 
ened, they became more dependent on the state for bureaucratic jobs, 
emoluments, and subsidies. The landed upper class also depended politically 
on the state to maintain its grip over the countryside. 58 Wealthy industrialists 
also were dependent on the state for highly favorable loans, subsidies, and 
protection from competition through limited licensing and quotas. Finally, 
the industrial upper class relied on state repression to keep the working class 
in place. 
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State policies towards the peasants and workers were entirely different. As the 
landed upper class lost its power and influence over the countryside, the state 
took its place and confronted the Russian peasantry directly. The state failed 
to improve the condition of the vast majority of these peasants living in 
communes, nor did it extend to them economic subsidies handed out to the 
landed upper class. Instead, they were forced to carry the burden of indus- 
trialization through heavy extraction of surplus, which kept peasants impov- 
erished. Workers in urban industries were also exploited and repressed. The 
Russian state rather than the market, mediated between the workers and 
employers. Consequently, economic issues and conflicts were rapidly politi- 
cized. 
Finally, society and the state were vulnerable to general economic crisis and 
thereby receptive to consolidation by major social classes and groups. The 
Russian economy, which was highly dependent on external capital, markets, 
and technology, was disrupted by the war and rendered incapable of func- 
tioning. At the same time, peasant communes and workers' solidarity struc- 
tures provided the resources for mobilization and collective action, leading 
to a consolidation of forces. 
Adversely affected by several decades of state-sponsored development, the 
Russian working classes had both the capacity to act collectively and a clear 
target of attack. The narrow alliance between the state and the upper class 
had a negative impact upon the rest of the Russian society, thus polarizing 
the population. State policies were substituted for the invisible hand of the 
market, thus politicizing most important economic issues. Finally, the crisis 
generated by the war, facilitated the formation of coalitions and consolida- 
tion among major segments of Russian society, resulting in the downfall of 
the Tsar. 
The Bolsheviks gradually merged political and economic structures to the 
point where the state completely assumed the allocation and accumulation of 
capital. As a consequence, all social and economic issues were politicized. 
Although total political-economic integration expanded state resources, it 
also set limits on the ability of the state to carry out certain policies. Forced 
industrialization and collectivization so polarized society that the state could 
preserve the social order only through massive repression. In the 1950s, 
terror was reduced.as a result of KhruShchev's reforms, which improved the 
standard of living of the Soviet working class and gave workers the right to 
change jobs at will. Although the reforms created a semi-free labor markei, 
they did not change the basic social structure in which the state controlled 
capital allocation and accumulation. This structure has led to confrontation 
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whenever the state has threatened workers' established rights. In 1962, a 
workers' revolt in Novocherkassk against state-initiated price increases was 
severely repressed. Through subsequent reforms, Soviet leaders attempted to 
rationalize the economy, reducing reliance on central planning while increas- 
ing the role of individual enterprises in promoting efficiency and profitability 
in the 1960s. As a result, these "reformed" enterprises drastically reduced the 
number of workers, improved work organization and productivity, lowered 
costs, and stimulated the economic interests of the remaining workers. By 
placing greater emphasis on technicians, engineers, and experts, such re- 
forms threatened the interests of lower and middle level bureaucrats. More 
importantly, they suddenly converted semi-skilled workers into a "reserve 
army" of unemployed laborers. Not surprisingly, discontented bureaucrats 
and workers formed an informal alliance that interrupted the reforms in the 
early 1970s. 59 Confrontation between workers and the state prevented the 
Soviet leaders from pursuing policies that American capitalists carried out 
easily in the 1980s. 
Today, the Soviet working class, prevented from participating in decision 
making, accepts the prevailing distribution of power as long as prices of basic 
necessities and major services remain low, jobs are guaranteed, and people 
are free to seek individual means to improve their living standards. 6~ Deterio- 
ration of these conditions may lead to economic polarization resulting in 
attacks against the state. 
To reduce the likelihood of popular confrontation with the state, Soviet 
leaders have attempted to fragment the population. Such strategies include 
raising inequality within the working class by promoting closed enterprises 
and closed cities employing skilled labor at higher pay and providing channels 
of upward mobility for highly talented individuals. These measures along with 
the ever-present fear of repression reduce the chances of collective action. As 
a result, most people choose individual ways of improving their lives. Some 
who refuse to accept the prevailing order may resort to alcoholism, an 
historical Russian solution that predates the October revolution. Under 
these conditions, minorities who reject the social order can only generate 
segmented conflict that rarely succeeds in bringing change, for it can easily be 
repressed. 
Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan revolution of 1979 occurred within a primarily agrarian 
structure that was undergoing some measure of state-sponsored economic 
development. Significant changes in the world market and international 
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relations in the decades following 1950 enabled the state to take the initiative 
in the country's economic development. Despite some success, state activities 
polarized and politicized various segments of the population below the ruling 
class, resulting in the revolutionary struggles of 1977-1978 that culminated in 
the downfall of the Somoza regime in July 1979. 
Following World War II, the Nicaraguan government actively began to 
promote economic development. The state expanded the nation's infrastruc- 
ture including highways, roads, railsystems; supplied electric power; and 
most importantly, allocated capital for economic investment. In the 1960s 
the National Economic Council designed plans to reduce Nicaragua's 
vulnerability to fluctuations in the world market. The Planning Office 
encouraged agricultural diversification, and promoted industrial develop- 
ment within the framework of the Central American Common Market. 
State economic policies generated sustained economic growth. The GDP 
grew at a real average rate of 5.2 percent in the 1950s and 7 percent in the 
1960s. 61 Although the economy experienced sharp cyclical downswings in 
the late 1950s and late 1960s, in general the post-war era can be characterized 
as the most dynamic period in Nicaragua's economic history. 
The state played a central role in agricultural diversification and develop- 
ment. Historically, Nicaragua's economy had been based almost solely on 
coffee and bananas. In the 1950s, the state encouraged the production of 
cotton by building appropriate infrastructures, providing favorable ex- 
change rates, tariffs, and pricing policies, all of which stimulated investment 
in labor-saving machinery. In 1950, Nicaragua probably had less than 500 
tractors, while five years later, there were 2,500. The state subsidized irriga- 
tion and research projects as well as the construction of storage, processing, 
and marketing facilities. More importantly, the state pursued a subsidized 
credit policy. After 1960, the Banco Nacional extended credit based on yield, 
which further encouraged rationalized production. 62 By the mid-1950s, cot- 
ton growers were receiving two-thirds of the value of all bank credit. 63 
Equally significant, throughout this era, the state prevented the formation of 
unions among the majority of rural workers; as a result, wages were kept low 
and capital accumulation was rapid. 
The results of these policies were impressive. In combination, they were 
responsible for generating the highest yields in the world for nonirrigated 
land, twice the level of yields in the United States. 64 Cultivation land in- 
creased fivefold from 1950 to 1970, and cotton production rose from 3,300 
tons in 1950 to 125,000 in 1960. These state policies were later extended to 
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other export-oriented enterprises such as beef, sugar, bananas, and irrigated 
rice, which also soon prospered. 
The state also promoted industrial development through a policy of import- 
substitution. With the Alliance for Progress, American economic assistance 
more than doubled and military aid rose sevenfold. These resources enabled 
the Nicaraguan state to take crucial steps toward industrialization in the 
early 1960s. In addition to building infrastructure, the state extended favor- 
able exchange rates, tax holidays, and subsidized credit. Through limited 
licensing, it eliminated business competition, thereby providing secure 
markets. Equally important, workers' wages were kept low through state 
repression, which prevented the formation of strong and autonomous labor 
organizations and permitted rapid accumulation of capital. 
These state policies, together with increasing U.S. economic aid, generated 
positive results. Industrial production increased from 15.7 percent to 29 
percent of GDP between 1950 and 1970. Manufacturing was the basis of this 
growth, and its share of GDP increased from 11.5 in 1950 to 23.7 in 1977. 
From 1960 to 1970, manufacturing grew at l 1. l percent annually, a rate that 
was second only to Brazil in Latin America. 65 
However, growth was not experienced evenly. State allocation of capital was 
biased in favor of large, modern firms, which resulted in further concentra- 
tion. For example, fewer than twenty exporters accounted for all cotton 
exports, with most of the trade going to five firms. Large cattle ranchers also 
benefitted tremendously from state policies. Twenty-seven percent of all 
cattle and more than half of the available pasturage was controlled by a mere 
2 percent of ranchers. The same conditions prevailed in the sugar, tobacco, 
and banana industries. 
The uneven policies had an adverse impact on small and medium-sized firms 
as well as the rural proletariat, many of whom were displaced. While 
agricultural production increased 137 percent from 1960 to 1977, the propor- 
tion of workers engaged in agriculture declined from 58 percent to 50 
percent. In 1977, 16 percent of the agrarian labor force was unemployed. 66 
An AID-sponsored inquiry undertaken in 1972 concluded that if action was 
not taken, the difference between haves and have-nots could lead to social 
upheavals. 67 Although some reforms in state credit policy and land distribu- 
tion emerged from the report, they proved too little and too late. 
State intervention in industry as in agriculture, favored large, modern enter- 
prises and led to heavy concentration. Of the 600 industrial plants employing 
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five or more persons, 136 produced 72 percent of the total output in 1971, 
while only 28 accounted for 35 percent. In contrast, 13,000 small enterprises 
were able to generate only 5 percent of the country's industrial production. 68 
Manufacturing, too, grew unevenly in different regions. Most manufactur- 
ing originated in the Pacific region. Factories in Managua accounted for 
about 60 percent of total manufacturing output. More advanced infrastruc- 
ture and access to financial services account for this regional development. 69 
The immediate result of this development was the rapid rise of inequality in 
wealth and income between 1960 and 1970. The upper class absorbed a 
growing share of the pie, while the middle and working classes received 
progressively less. Although no longitudinal data are available for this time 
period, all experts agree that the distribution of income worsened. Agrarian 
land was very unqually distributed with some 3.5 percent of the population 
owning 63. l percent, while the bottom 51 percent of the population owned 
only 7.5 percent of the land. 70 In the 1970s, the bottom half of income earners 
received 15 percent of the national income, while the top 5 percent received 
30 percent. 
Government policies failed to improve the quality of life for most Nicara- 
guans. Nearly half of the country's housing, and up to 80 percent in rural 
areas, lacked indoor plumbing. Nicaragua had the highest rate of alcoholism 
in Central America and the highest rate of homicide in the world) ~ The 
average Nicaraguan had a life expectancy of fifty-three years, the lowest in 
Central America. Infant mortality rate was the second highest in the region. 
Outside the cities, lack of potable water caused epidemic intestinal diseases 
that accounted for almost one-fifth of all deaths. Compared to other Central 
American countries, the Somoza government allocated the smallest share of 
its budget to health and education. 72 
Who were the principal beneficiaries of development? Three segments of the 
Nicaraguan bourgeoisie benefitted from government policies. The first 
group, the Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC), had its origins in the 1950s among 
old-line liberal landowners and the emerging cotton sector. The second 
group, the Banco de America (BANAMERICA), was tied originally to the 
conservative oligarchy. After the war, both invested heavily in manufactur- 
ing, commercial enterprises, real estate, and construction. The third group 
was the Somoza family and its closest collaborators who also made substan- 
tial investment in modern agriculture, industry, and commerce. Taking 
advantage of the Central American Common Market's reduction of trade 
barriers, the Somoza family entered into interregional commerce, fishing 
and fish canning, meat packing, tobacco products, shoes, and rice growing 
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and processing. They also invested in domestic construction, real estate, the 
mass media, auto products, and automobile importation. 
Although these three factions converged through various joint ventures in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, the Somoza group always held the upper hand. 
Supported by funds extracted from the state, (foreign aid) and its autono- 
mous entities - the National Bank, the National Light and Power Company, 
the National Lottery, the National Social Security Institute among others 
the Somoza faction was better able to compete with its two rivals. Control 
over state power enabled the Somozas to operate illegal businesses, create 
legal monopolies for themselves, and demand bribes in cash or business 
stock in exchange for licenses, concessions, and contracts. 73 
In the 1970s, natural disaster along with changes in the world market 
disrupted the Nicaraguan development and plunged the economy into a 
crisis. An earthquake in 1972 cost the lives of more than 10,000 people and 
leveled 600 square blocks in the heart of Managua. Most government offices, 
the financial district, some 2,500 shops, and 45 percent of all housing in 
Managua could not be used. 
The reconstruction of the city further expanded the role of the state in society 
and economy. The state had to plan and administer major projects. The state 
also became the vehicle for the expenditure of massive amounts of money 
secured through foreign loans. Increased state expenditures exerted consid- 
erable pressure on the supply of goods, especially construction materials. 
Shortages boosted the inflation rate from an annual average of 2.5 percent 
between 1965 and 1971, to 12 percent in 1973 and 14.5 percent in 1974. 
Structural changes in the world market economy also complicated Nicara- 
gua's crisis. The devaluation of the dollar, to which the cordoba was pegged, 
increased the prices of Nigaraguan imports from outside the United States. 
Increased oil prices also pushed up the inflation rate in Nicaragua and 
reduced her foreign exchange, because 70 percent of Nicaragua's electric 
power was generated by oil. Finally, despite rising coffee prices, Nicaragua's 
foreign exchange declined in response to the decreasing value of cotton, 
sugar, and meat exports. 
To finance the reconstruction after the earthquake, the state kept borrowing 
from international sources. By 1977, foreign debt had reached $1 billion, 
which represented a fourfold rise over six years, and the highest debt in 
Central America. As the World Bank and the International Development 
Bank began to question their policy of extending soft loans to Somoza, the 
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Nicaraguan government turned to private banks in the United States. Addi- 
tional funds obtained from this source worsened the problem of inflation. 
By the mid-1970s, the economy was in deep crisis and state policies proved 
highly disadvantageous for major segments of the population. The post- 
quake reconstruction program raised the work week from 48 to 60 hours and 
froze or cut wages. After 1974, the construction boom that followed the 
earthquake petered out, and by 1977, the GDP had dropped some 5 percent. 
At the same time, because of the war against the FSLN, the government 
doubled military expenditure, which could only be financed by printing 
more money (60 percent more than planned in 1978). In 1978, the govern- 
ment abolished tax exemption on industrial profits, thereby creating an 
additional $19 million in revenues. 
While most of the population suffered from the earthquake, Somoza turned 
the national disaster to his economic advantage. As the National Guard 
looted the devastated commercial sector and sold international relief mate- 
rials, Somoza and his associates pocketed international funds donated for 
relief. AID funds were disproportionately used to construct luxury housing 
for National Guard officers, while the homeless poor had to live in hastily 
constructed wooden shacks. TM Somoza surely enriched himself as well. Upon 
arriving in Miami, an exiled Somoza told reporters that he was worth only 
$100 million, but U.S. government sources placed the figure closer to $900 
million. 75 
To summarize the argument thus far, state intervention in the economy 
rapidly promoted economic development, especially in the agricultural sec- 
tor. State allocation of capital was highly uneven: large, modern enterprises 
received the available resources, while small, traditional firms were deprived. 
State policies toward urban and rural workers were repressive and designed 
for rapid capital accumulation. The immediate consequence of these policies 
was a rise in social inequality and economic polarization. With the exception 
of the big bourgeoisie allied with Somoza, the development policies of the 
Nicaraguan government had negative consequences for all social classes. 
With the increasing politicization of capital allocation and accumulation, the 
disadvantaged could not blame themselves or the market. Consequently, the 
state was soon to become the target of attack. 
More than two decades of economic development brought about changes 
that facilitated mobilization among the opposition. Urbanization rose from 
less than 30 percent in 1960 to about 40 percent prior to the revolution. 
Although repression prevented the formation of independent labor organi- 
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zations, which represented about 5.5 percent of all workers in the early 1970s, 
industrial concentration in a few areas contributed to workers' capacity to 
act collectively. 
Social and political organizations played an active role in mobilizing the 
population. In April 1972, several months before the earthquake, the Nica- 
raguan Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter criticizing social conditions 
within the country. The Church boycotted a ceremony transferring the 
executive office to a three-member junta. Led by Chamoro, the opposition 
denounced the formation of the junta, which postponed elections until 1974. 
In the meantime, Somoza ordered the passage of strict legislation making it a 
crime for the press to "defame" the government. Despite another law, 
making failure to vote a crime, less than half of the eligible voters participat- 
ed in the elections of September 1974 in which Somoza was elected president. 
Again, the bishops refused to attend the inauguration and issued a joint 
statement criticizing the regime's economic policies. The political opposition 
also denounced the election as a meaningless fraud and formed a broad- 
based coalition, the Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL), which included 
the Moscow-oriented branch of the Communist Party. 76 
However, the opposition needed a more dynamic factor to consolidate 
rather than remain fragmented in small organizations, to become more 
effective. Toward that end, the Sandinistas played a historic role by aggra- 
vating social conflicts, seizing leadership from reformist forces, and mobiliz- 
ing the masses to overthrow the regime. 
By 1974, the Sandinistas had conducted unsuccessful guerrilla warfare for 
more than a decade. With the deepening crisis, their chance of success 
increased. In a brilliantly executed raid on 27 December 1974, they attacked 
a reception for U.S. Ambassador Turner Shelton at the mansion of Jose 
Maria "Chema" Castillo Quant, the Minister of Agriculture, formerly linked 
with Somoza's office of security. Somoza was forced to bow to guerilla 
demands for a $2 million ransom, the release of a number of Sandinista 
prisoners including Daniel Ortega Saavedra, dissemination of guerilla com- 
muniques in La Prensa and over two TV channels and six radio stations. 
The success of the daring attack encouraged all segments of society. The 
moderate bourgeoisie became openly critical of the regime, while the work- 
ing class revealed a striking combativity. In response, Somoza declared a 
state of siege that lasted for thirty-three months. The resulting repression 
weakened the FSLN splitting it into three factions. Because discontent was 
mounting, however, the Carter Administration pressured Somoza to lift the 
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siege, which he did on 5 September 1977. The result was a rapid spread of 
popular protests. 
Schism remained within the opposition. In particular, non-Somoza busi- 
nesses were weakly divided, lacking the organization and political experience 
to lead the opposition. Some pressed for democratic freedoms and minimum 
constitutional guarantees, while others went further and demanded the 
removal of Somoza. Without allying with other social groups, these factions 
could accomplish little, if anything. 
As various political organizations within the business sector emerged only to 
decline, the Sandinistas sought collaboration but consistently rejected re- 
formist tendencies, especially those encouraged by the United States and 
segments of the Nicaraguan businesses, as "Somocizmo sin Somoza," or 
Somocism without Somoza. In October 1977, twelve prominent profession- 
als (two lawyers, two businessmen, two priests, an academic, a writer, an 
agronomist, an architect, a banker, and a dental surgeon) signed a political 
document supporting the FS LN. This public endorsement bestowed consid- 
erable respectability on the FSLN, and helped bridge the gap between the 
guerrillas and the non-Somoza bourgeoisie. 
With the failure of business to take the lead in what was rapidly becoming a 
mass movement, a radical faction of the FSLN, the Tendencia Insurreccion- 
al, called for immediate armed insurrection. They believed that the working 
class, middle class, and church groups would support and participate in such 
a policy. In the early summer of 1978, they began forming their national 
political organization, the United People's Movement, allying with left-wing 
parties and organizations. 
Finally, the faction of the FSLN, the Tendecia Insureccional, took an 
important step that further enhanced its popularity and support. On 22 
August 1978, they attacked the National Palace. This operation netted the 
FSLN $ l0 million, freedom for some fifty political prisoners, and enormous 
media publicity. The operation also united the three Sandinista factions. 
From then on, they cooperated intensely with other political organizations 
and church groups, to unify the fragmented opposition, which consisted of 
workers, disaffected businesses, and the middle class. These coalitions con- 
solidated all the major forces against the regime. Grounded in urban strikes 
and armed insurrection by many consolidated communities and barrios, the 
FSLN was able to seize power from the Somoza regime in July 1979. 
In summary, the Nicaraguan state took an active role in promoting economic 
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development in the 1950s and 1960s. The state intervened in capital accumu- 
lation through provision of favorable conditions, limited licensing, quotas, 
grants, and subsidies to a small circle of the population. Undermining the 
market mechanism, the state repressed the work force, politicized the ac- 
cumulation, and polarized the Nicaraguan society. At the same time, the 
economic development did not reduce Nicaragua's dependence on the world 
market. Thus, Nicaragua remained highly vulnerable to economic crisis. 
Once the crisis erupted, disadvantaged classes attacked the state. The high 
level of consolidation eventually overthrew the state. 
Iran 
Iran's modern economic development began after the 1963 "White Revolu- 
tion." Following land reform, the state provided favorable conditions for 
industrial growth. At the same time, rising oil revenues allowed the state to 
expand its own activities, becoming the most significant agent of develop- 
ment and industrialization. In contrast to western states, which derived their 
income from taxes, the Shah"s state relied heavily on a single major resource: 
oil. Control of oil revenues gave the state a high level of economic independ- 
ence, for it no longer relied on any internal sources of revenues. The result of 
this development was the almost total domination of the society and the 
economy by the capitalist state. This oil wealth was invested by the state in 
such a way as to have negative consequences for all major social classes 
leading to polarization and consolidation that overthrew the Shah. 
In the post-1963 period, the Iranian upper class was small, consisting of an 
upper echelon of government bureaucracy, a small group of entrepreneurs 
engaged in large-scale commerce, finance~ and industry, and capitalist land- 
owners. Within this bloc, the bureaucratic faction held the upper hand, but 
no group enjoyed a power base independent of the Shah's state. No segment 
of Iranian society could launch a maj or economic undertaking without includ- 
ing the royal family, if only indirectly. By and large, the majority of those 
who emerged as the new barons could do so through political ties with the 
royal court. Few of these men came from simple origins; such were people 
like Khayami and Saber. After an initial success, these "self-made" men were 
drawn into the royal orbit, where they were ordered to start certain industrial 
ventures; but whatever their origins, they needed political ties with the royal 
court in order to gain influence and access to multinational corporations. 
Despite massive accumulation, the small economically dependent industrial 
upper class failed to provide the monarchy with a strong base of support. 
State development policies could not overcome the historical weakness of 
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Iranian private capital, which invested heavily in trade and real estate. In 
1976 there were about fifty thousand industrial employers in Iran, represent- 
ing slightly more than 1 percent of the urban work force. This sector was 
expanding relatively slowly and had increased by less than ten thousand 
since 1966. Two thirds of these employers were still located in food and 
textile manufacturing. Paradoxically, although the Shah's state was strong 
economically, it remained weak socially. 
The economic strength and independence of the state did not mean that it 
acted impartially in its social and economic policies. In both industry and 
agriculture, the Shah's economic development strategy always favored the 
rich over the poor, the big over the small, the urban over the rural, and the 
skilled over the unskilled. These policies inevitably enriched a minority of the 
population. This demonstrated link between state policies and capital ac- 
cumulation clearly revealed the class nature of the state. In the view of most 
Iranians, the state was determined to serve particular, rather than societal 
interests. These characteristics, along with specific economic development 
policies, led to its downfall. 
To explain the political events of 1977-1979, we must analyze the economic 
development policies of the Shah's state; the way in which the government 
resources were utilized; and their subsequent impact upon various social 
classes and political interests. In short, we must examine the development of 
the oil sector. 
Oil revenues, the primary state assets and indeed the basis of the whole 
economy in the 1970s, rose sharply from 12 percent of the GNP (40,000 
million rials) in 1963 to over 25 percent of the GNP for 1971-1972. In 1973, it 
suddenly increased to 1,333,300 million rials (nearly $18 billion), accounting 
for 50 percent of the GNP. By 1978, howver, it subsided to 1,284,900 million 
rials, which still was almost 35 percent of the GNP. 77 
When the nation's financial resouces quadrupled in the last quarter of 1973 
due to rising oil revenues, the Shah of Iran proclaimed free school milk, free 
education up to the 8th grade, and free higher education for those who 
wished to serve the government after graduation. Shortly afterwards, the 
government set aside its previous five-year plan, then less than one year old, 
and substituted a new set of objectives costing $69 billion, which was twice 
the original cost. 
During the next two years, the Iranian economy experienced a period of 
unprecedented boom. From March 1974 to March 1975 the government 
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spent $22 billion, a sum almost equal to the entire expenditure of the three 
previous years. The GNP, which had risen by 8 percent per annum in the 
1960s jumped by 14.2 percent in 1972-1973, 30.3 percent in 1973-1974, and 
42 percent in 1974 1975. Between 1972 and 1978 the GNP grew from $17.3 
billion to an estimated $ 54.6 billion, while GNP per capita rose from $450 in 
1971 to $1,344 in 1974. TM 
Iran's industrial growth was one of the highest among Third World nations. 
Manufacturing grew at an average rate of 12.3 percent per annum for the 
1963 1972 period, or almost twice as fast as the average growth of this sector 
in other developing countries. The rate of industrial growth for the decade of 
1965-1975 was 15.2 percent per annum. 
However, the nation's economic development was highly uneven. A rise in 
urban income expanded the demand for agricultural commodities, but the 
agrarian sector could not keep up, and hence, benefitted little from the 
general economic growth. The inability of the peasantry to take advantage of 
the situation by stepping up production had nothing to do with the myth of 
"the peasant lack of response." Rather, the failure of the agrarian sector was 
the result of technical and institutional constraints as well as the deliberate 
neglect of agriculture in the government's development strategy. 
Institutional constraints were rooted in the way the land reform had been 
carried out. To begin, half of the village families were excluded from land 
reform because they lacked formal sharecropping agreements with the land- 
owners. Without land, this group was quickly transformed into a rural 
proletariat that lived in extreme poverty. Of those who obtained land, about 
75 percent received less than the seven hectares needed for subsistence 
agriculture. Furthermore, most of the land that was distributed was of 
inferior quality and barely adequate for cultivation. This was so because the 
government allowed absentee landlords to select the portion of their land to 
be sold, and as a result, half of the best land was never redistributed. 79 
Absentee landlords accounted for roughly 2 percent of the landowners in 
1960 and owned 55 percent of the arable land. Despite land reform, they were 
able to keep about half of their holdings, or some 20 million acres out of a 
total of 42 million acres. Most absentee landlords managed their land by 
means of a sharecropping system that had operated before land reform. A 
small minority of landlords whose holdings averaged 250 or more acres, 
practiced capitalist agriculture, using wage laborers, machinery, and other 
production inputs such as fertilizers. 
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Not surprisingly, these limited improvements did not lead to any major 
transformation of agricultural production. From 1963 to 1974, real invest- 
ment in agricultural machinery and equipment grew by 6.7 percent per 
annum, while total investment increased by 20 percent. During the same 
period, the share of agriculture in the GNP declined from 16.6 percent to 5. I 
percent, s0 
The government's development strategy almost totally neglected the agricul- 
tural sector in favor of the industrial sector. The government implemented 
land reform and then left peasants to their own devices, as though the formal 
transfer of land titles would prove enough of an incentive to generate a 
miracle in agricultural productivity. Although government investment in 
the agrarian sector was generally low, there were some exceptions of exten- 
sive state investment in land improvement, machinery, tractors, leveling, 
irrigation, and fertilizers that produced satisfactory results. However, be- 
cause the government extended its low interest rate credit only to big 
producers, most agricultural producers could not take advantage of these 
improvements. Rich landlords were charged less than 5 percent interest while 
others had to pay more than 14 percent. In the 1970s, the government finally 
decided to pay greater attention to the agricultural sector, but it was already 
too late. 
With rising oil revenues and growing agricultural shortages, the government 
began to import and subsidize food items. Through generous subsidies, the 
government kept food prices down for political reasons. By 1977, the cost to 
Iranian farmers to produce a ton of wheat or rice was greater than the price 
these goods could fetch in the urban retail market. Consequently, agricultur- 
al production declined even further. The final result was tragic and lamen- 
table. Never before had the nation been so rich nor its peasants so poor and 
incapable of feeding the population. 
A country that prior to land reform imported very few foodstuffs now 
became one of the leading importers of food and agricultural products in the 
Middle East. By 1978, Iran's importation of food was increasing by 14 
percent per annum. Experts estimated that at this rate, lran would be 
importing half of its food by 1985. Instead of at least cautioning the govern- 
ment against such a policy, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development advised the government in 1974 that: "Iran should not consid- 
er itself vulnerable to fluctuations in world supplies and prices if it adopts a 
logical long-term import policy ... Iran can, in addition, import many 
agricultural products at a lower cost than it would take to produce them 
locally... Imports could thus serve to reduce consumer prices. T M  
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The impact of these policies on agriculture was catastrophic. Deteriorating 
agricultural conditions led to peasant migration. From the mid-sixties, 
approximately a quarter of a million peasants left for the cities every year, 
further worsening the situation in the rural sector. With the departure of the 
young from the countryside, many of the traditional irrigation canals, or 
ghanats, dried up due to neglect or the sinking water table that resulted from 
uncontrolled pumping by machines owned by rich farmers, agri-business, or 
state-run farm cooperatives. Deprived of the younger generation, its most 
active and able members, agrarian society was unable to utilize its resources. 
In an unprecedented occurrence, agrarian land was left fallow in many parts 
of the country, with no one to tend it or even fight over rights of possession. 
The contrast with England is instructive. In England, according to Thomas 
More, "sheep ate men" during the enclosure movement, whereas in Iran, the 
state's development policies consumed both sheep and men. In England, a 
process of "primitive accumulation" separated producers from their means 
of production, resulting in rapid economic development. The British history 
of expropriation, which as Marx 82 put it, "was written in the annals of 
mankind in letters of blood and fire," contrasted sharply with the Iranian 
experience. The separation of producers from their means of production in 
lran was carried out through the operation of market forces characterized by 
neither bloodshed nor development, but replete with suffering. 
In the urban sector, state policies led to widening income inequality and 
concentration of wealth. To begin, state industrial policies favored monopo- 
lies in import-substitution. Through limited licensing and tax concessions, 
the state encouraged a high rate of return for the major industrialists. Profits 
of 30 to 50 percent were normal and gains of 100 to 200 percent were not 
unknown in the industrial sector. 83 State banks provided low-interest credit 
to large, modern enterprises, ignoring small, traditional sectors. In addition, 
the nature of industrial development, which was capital intensive and used 
mostly skilled labor, created a labor aristocracy that further stratified the 
working class. Peasant migration swelled the ranks of the unskilled work 
force, intensifying the rate of urban inequality. Furthermore, the capacity of 
the work force to demand higher wages was effectively eliminated through 
government supression of independent labor organizations. At the same 
time, rising inflation posed a threat to all who lived on fixed incomes. Fina~lly, 
the state's development policies ignored national minorities, especially the 
Kurds, giving rise to regional inequalities. 
In a study on income distribution, the International Labor Organization 
concluded that in 1969-1970, the Gini Coefficient (a measure of income 
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inequality) for lran was higher than any country in the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia, considerably higher than Western countries, and as high or 
higher than Latin American countries for which data were available. Be- 
tween 1959 and 1974, the expenditure share of the top 20 percent of house- 
holds in urban areas increased from 52 to 56 percent while that of the bottom 
40 percent declined from 14 percent to 11 percent, s4 Increased oil revenues 
exacerbated existing inequalities. 
In 1974, forty-seven of the wealthiest families controlled 85 percent of those 
firms with a turnover of more than 10 million rials, s5 Of these, a mere ten 
families owned between ten and seventy-four businesses for a total of 390 
corporations. Not surprisingly, in its march toward the "Great Civilization," 
the royal family itself became the wealthiest in the country. They owned 137 
of the 527 largest corporations and financial institutions, and controlled a 
major segment of the economy through their private assets. In the face of 
growing revolutionary pressures, the Shah belatedly issued a private "code of 
conduct" on 3 July 1978, barring the royal family from profiteering in 
business deals. Two months later, he prohibited members of the royal family 
from financial dealings with government agencies or firms doing business 
with the government. Despite the token reforms, wealth remained highly 
concentrated. 
As oil wealth accumulated within the small circles, agriculture deteriorated, 
and shanty towns proliferated around major cities. Strikes were outlawed 
and labor leaders imprisoned. Leftists, intellectuals, and autonomy-seeking 
Kurds were persecuted. Thus, the Shah's regime failed to turn Iran into an 
industrial society, economically independent from oil and the world market. 
Instead, Iranian society became increasingly polarized. The industrial upper 
class remained tiny, a mere 1.04 percent of the urban work force, but it 
possessed a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth. By the end of the 
Shah's rule, more than half the labor force was still employed in agriculture, 
but they accounted for less than 10 percent of the national income. What 
actually took place in Iran was not genuine, independent economic devel- 
opment, industrialization, or modernization; it was rather rapid economic 
growth that established some enclave industrial structures highly dependent 
on the world market and without adequate backward or forward linkages to 
the rest of the Iranian economy. A historic opportunity had been missed. 
The most significant structural transformation was state penetration and 
politicization of the economy. At the end of this period, the state itself was 
the major wealthholder. Its oil accounted for more than a third of the 
national income. The state also owned all other sources of energy and 
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minerals, all large modern industries, most of the transport, communica- 
tions, banking, and insurance firms, and a sizeable number of farms and 
agri-business. The entire private sector seems to have received less than 20 
percent of the national income. 86 The state had.become a visible actor, 
playing a central role in the economic development of the country, and the 
vehicle for distributing the new oil wealth. 
However, the government was unable to increase its expenditures as antici- 
pated. Continued world-wide recession, a mild European winter, and a 
relatively modest increase in the OPEC price ofoil  soon reduced oil produc- 
tion and revenues in lran. By December of 1975, oil production was running 
twenty percent below the same period one year earlier. By 1978, oil revenues 
had declined from 1,333,300 rials in 1973, which represented 50 percent of 
the GNP, to 1,284,900 million rials, or slightly less than 35 percent of GNP. 87 
As a result, by mid-1976, government expenditures exceeded revenues, 
precipitating a fiscal crisis that forced the Iranian government to borrow 
funds from international sources. A shortage of funds had already led some 
commercial banks to turn to the international market for short-term loans. 
Despite financial shortfalls, commercial banks, during this period, were 
allowed to maintain a liberal credit policy as the money supply kept increas- 
ing at a rate of 60 percent per annum. 
As early as mid-1975, the economy was out of control. Shortages led to price 
increases and a high rate of inflation. In order to reduce inflation, the IMF 
mission advised the government to reduce expenditures. Iranian officials 
ignored the advice, blaming instead the imported inflation for the rapid 
increase in prices. Soaring inflation led the government to control prices on 
the one hand, and increase imports by lifting the tariffs on the other. 
However, Iranian ports lacked facilities to handle increased imports, nor was 
there an adequate infrastructure to satisfy the demands of a suddenly hyper- 
active economy. Bottlenecks and inadequate transportation created lines of 
up to two hundred ships waiting an average of 160 days to unload their cargo. 
The result was the waste of resources and imported goods on a massive scale. 
As part of its attempt to impose price controls, the government also imple- 
mented a campaign against "profiteering." In August 1975, the government 
rolled back prices of sixteen thousand items to their January 1974 levels. 
Although the profit rate was officially set at 14 percent, the inflation rate was 
at least twice that amount according to the government's own reports. 
Anyone who violated the price controls was to be arrested. 
The state's policy of price controls had far-reaching consequences. The 
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decision to control prices was implemented at the level of retail markets 
where merchants and shopkeepers operated. No control was imposed at the 
factory level where commodities were produced and priced; nor were con- 
trols placed on the few giant import firms. Because the profiteering campaign 
was unevenly enforced, few industrialists were arrested, and those who were 
prosecuted were outsiders, such as Elghanian, a Jewish industrialist or Habib 
Sabet, a member of the Baha'i community who stayed in Paris, and never 
returned home. 
The impact on the traditional middle class, namely merchants and shop- 
keepers, was devastating. In the first few days of the campaign, the govern- 
ment arrested 7,750 shopkeepers. 88 By the end of 1977, approximately one 
year before the revolution, some 20,000 shopkeepers had been put into jail, 
according to the Ministry of the Interior. A report by Ettelaat, one of the two 
main daily newspapers, indicated that by the end of October 1977, over 
109,800 Tehran shopkeepers out of a total of less than 200,000 had violated 
price controls in one way or another, and had files in court pending investiga- 
tion. 89 Throughout the entire country, the number of shopkeepers violating 
price controls had reached 220,000 by the fall of 1978. 90 Many of the 
violators lost their licenses and were forced to close down. The price controls 
also caused bankruptcies among the traditional middle class. Thousands of 
small merchants and shopkeepers lost their businesses in a short time. It had 
become virtually impossible for the traditional middle class to do business 
without violating the regulations. 
The "anti-profiteering" campaign generated an irreconcilable conflict with 
the traditional middle class leaving merchants and shopkeepers no alterna- 
tive but collective action. Although the traditional middle class was in 
decline, it was still large and powerful, constituting almost a quarter of the 
work force in urban areas. More importantly, in addition to its commercial 
networks, many members of this class had retained their links to the mosque 
and supported it through religious taxes. As a consequence, the mosque 
became a base of support for the traditional middle class against the Shah, 
especially since some clerics followed Ayatollah Khomeini in opposing the 
Shah. By fall 1977, the traditional middle class had begun mobilizing its 
resources against the state. For several months, its members protested by 
shutting down bazaars, participating in demonstrations, and holding mourn- 
ing ceremonies in mosques. After months of sustained struggles, the tradi- 
tional middle class was able to draw in other adversely affected classes and 
groups into a coalition. 
In the fall of 1978, the new middle class and autonomy-seeking Kurds joined 
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the opposition. The industrial working class, repressed politically and disaf- 
fected by rising inflation, began strikes at the same time. Their target of 
attack was the state. Initially, some demanded redress for economic grievan- 
ces, dissolution of state-run unions and formation of independent labor 
organizations. As the crisis deepened, their demands became largely politi- 
cal. Oil workers played the most fundamental role. Heavily concentrated in a 
few regions, holding the key to the nation's most vital resource, they were in a 
unique position to influence the political process. In confrontations with the 
state, they struck several times and eventually refused to pump oil, calling for 
the overthrow of the regime. 
By the end of 1978, all major segments of society including clergy, intellectu- 
als, workers, and the middle class, had entered into an implicit coalition with 
the traditional middle class. The consolidated forces, led by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, were finally able to overthrow the monarchy in February of 1979. 
To summarize, as oil revenues increased, the state became further integrated 
into the economy. State intervention undermined market forces, politicized 
capital accumulation, and polarized society. At the same time, Iranian 
economy became totally dependent on the oil revenues. The uneven devel- 
opment of the oil sector resulted in a crisis of revenue absorption, which in 
turn led to a high rate of inflation. The state attempted to check the rising 
inflation through price controls and an "antiprofiteering campaign." The 
imposition of price controls set the stage for a revolutionary conflict between 
the state and the traditional middle class leading to consolidation and 
dissolution of the monarchy. 
Conclusion 
Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of 
social conflicts and political transformation. A combination of low 
political and economic integration and a high level of consolidation results in 
reformist conflicts. Low state intervention in the allocation and accumula- 
tion of capital reduces the probability that class conflict will be directed 
against the state. When state intervention is low, depoliticized, abstract 
market forces determine capital allocation and accumulation. In addition, 
low political and economic integration may give the state the appearance of 
serving societal interests rather than the interests of the upper class. This 
appearance of autonomy is reinforced by the institutions of formal demo- 
cracy. As a consequence, class conflict is contained within civil society and 
deflected from the state. When consolidation is high, reformist conflicts 
against holders of capital may emerge. The United States experienced such 
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movements in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, the state was drawn 
into some conflicts, but was not attacked by the working class. Today, the 
United States, like other advanced industrial societies, is less receptive to 
consolidation because of moderate levels of economic polarization, greater 
economic resilience, and high social differentiation. When state intervention 
and consolidation are low, organized groups with resources may gain eco- 
nomic benefits through segmented class conflict, whereas collectivities with 
weak solidarity and few resources remain inactive. Such is the case in the 
United States today. 
The combination of a high level of state intervention in capital allocation and 
accumulation with a high level of consolidation increases the likeli- 
hood of revolutionary conflict. High state intervention in capital allocation 
and accumulation has crucial social consequences. First, it politicizes other- 
wise abstract market relations. Second, it clearly reveals the state to be allied 
with a small circle of upper-class entrepreneurs, thereby discrediting the 
state's claim to serve societal interest. As a consequence, class conflict can 
readily assume a political character, expanding its target to include the state. 
A high level of consolidation enhances the capacity of challenging groups to 
act collectively to resist repression and seize power. Consolidation is more 
likely in societies with a high level of economic polarization, highly depend- 
ent economies, and low social differentiation. Russia in 1917 and lran and 
Nicaragua in 1979 are revealing examples. The Russian and Nicaraguan 
revolutions were carried out primarily by workers and peasants, which helps 
explain the socialist orientation of the new leadership. In contrast, in Iran, 
the revolution was largely based on the conflicts and struggles of the tradi- 
tional middle class, which eventually led to the formation of the theocratic 
state. A combination of high state intervention and low consolidation gener- 
ates segmented conflict directed against the state. Many Third World socie- 
ties are experiencing such a conflict today. 
To conclude, Marx's analysis focused primarily on social classes underem- 
phasizing the significance of the state and its relation to society and economy. 
Skocpors analysis, on the other hand, primarily focused on the state and the 
upper class, and failed to specify the proper, determining variables. If the 
analysis presented here is useful in specifying the conditions and forms of 
social conflicts, we must pay greater attention to social structural analysis, 
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